The Strategy of Conflict'In eminently lucid and often charming language, Professor Schelling's work opens to rational analysis a crucial field of politics, the international politics of threat, or as the current term goes, of deterrence. In this field, the author's analysis goes beyond what has been done by earlier writers. It is the best, most incisive, and most stimulating book on the subject.' |
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Page 9
... course of action for each participant depends on what he expects the 3 The lack of a vigorous intellectual tradition in the field of military strategy is forcefully discussed by Bernard Brodie in the first chapters of his Strategy in ...
... course of action for each participant depends on what he expects the 3 The lack of a vigorous intellectual tradition in the field of military strategy is forcefully discussed by Bernard Brodie in the first chapters of his Strategy in ...
Page 109
... course , perhaps a random course . Let this machine scan ; let the players watch it scan , watch their own and each other's meters , and watch each other's faces if they wish to . Finally , we go through with the game ; and there may be ...
... course , perhaps a random course . Let this machine scan ; let the players watch it scan , watch their own and each other's meters , and watch each other's faces if they wish to . Finally , we go through with the game ; and there may be ...
Page 124
... course of action , the threat fixes a course of reaction , of response to the other player . The commitment is a means of gaining first move in a game in which first move carries an advantage ; the threat is a commitment to a strategy ...
... course of action , the threat fixes a course of reaction , of response to the other player . The commitment is a means of gaining first move in a game in which first move carries an advantage ; the threat is a commitment to a strategy ...
Contents
The Retarded Science of International Strategy | 3 |
An Essay on Bargaining | 21 |
Bargaining Communication and Limited War | 53 |
Copyright | |
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Common terms and phrases
action advantage adversary agreement all-out balance of terror bargaining game behavior cell chance Chapter choice choose clue Column commitment communication concert conflict cooperative game coordination coordination game decision depends deterrence enemy enforcement evidence example expected value game theory identify incentive initial interest involved John Harsanyi jointly kind knows likelihood limited limited war Luce and Raiffa mathematical matrix means military minimax missiles mixed strategies move mutual Nash Nash point negotiation no-attack nonzero-sum game nuclear weapons offer one's other's outcome pair participants particular partner party payoff payoff matrix penalty play possible potential preference principle probability problem promise pure Quemoy random rational players recognize retaliation retaliatory forces risk role Row's rules Russians side situation solution stable strategy strike structure suggestion suppose surprise attack symmetry tacit bargaining tacit game tactic threat threaten tion tive value system yield zero-sum game