The Strategy of Conflict'In eminently lucid and often charming language, Professor Schelling's work opens to rational analysis a crucial field of politics, the international politics of threat, or as the current term goes, of deterrence. In this field, the author's analysis goes beyond what has been done by earlier writers. It is the best, most incisive, and most stimulating book on the subject.' |
From inside the book
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Page 119
... situation " to have a bear by the tail " ; how do we identify the payoff matrix , the communication system , and the enforce- ment system that it embodies ? What are the tactics Enforcement, Communication, and Strategic Moves.
... situation " to have a bear by the tail " ; how do we identify the payoff matrix , the communication system , and the enforce- ment system that it embodies ? What are the tactics Enforcement, Communication, and Strategic Moves.
Page 134
... Enforcement schemes . Agreements are unenforcible if no out- side authority exists to enforce them or if noncompliance would be inherently undetectable . The problem arises , then , of finding forms of agreement , or terms to agree on ...
... Enforcement schemes . Agreements are unenforcible if no out- side authority exists to enforce them or if noncompliance would be inherently undetectable . The problem arises , then , of finding forms of agreement , or terms to agree on ...
Page 137
... enforcement . Enforcement of promises is also relevant to the influence of a third party that wishes to make an efficient outcome more difficult for the other two players . A potent means of banning illegal activities has often been the ...
... enforcement . Enforcement of promises is also relevant to the influence of a third party that wishes to make an efficient outcome more difficult for the other two players . A potent means of banning illegal activities has often been the ...
Contents
The Retarded Science of International Strategy | 3 |
An Essay on Bargaining | 21 |
Bargaining Communication and Limited War | 53 |
Copyright | |
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Common terms and phrases
action advantage adversary agreement all-out balance of terror bargaining game behavior cell chance Chapter choice choose clue Column commitment communication concert conflict cooperative game coordination coordination game decision depends deterrence enemy enforcement evidence example expected value game theory identify incentive initial interest involved John Harsanyi jointly kind knows likelihood limited limited war Luce and Raiffa mathematical matrix means military minimax missiles mixed strategies move mutual Nash Nash point negotiation no-attack nonzero-sum game nuclear weapons offer one's other's outcome pair participants particular partner party payoff payoff matrix penalty play possible potential preference principle probability problem promise pure Quemoy random rational players recognize retaliation retaliatory forces risk role Row's rules Russians side situation solution stable strategy strike structure suggestion suppose surprise attack symmetry tacit bargaining tacit game tactic threat threaten tion tive value system yield zero-sum game