## The Strategy of ConflictNo background in mathematics needed, but some knowledge of game theory useful. |

### From inside the book

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Page 71

Thomas C. Schelling. There is perhaps a little more to this need for a mutually

identifiable resting place . If one is about to make a concession , he needs to

control his adversary ' s

retreat .

Thomas C. Schelling. There is perhaps a little more to this need for a mutually

identifiable resting place . If one is about to make a concession , he needs to

control his adversary ' s

**expectations**; he needs a recognizable limit to his ownretreat .

Page 92

The concept of role in sociology , which explicitly involves the

others have about one ' s behavior , as well as one ' s

others will behave toward him , can in part be interpreted in terms of the stability

of ...

The concept of role in sociology , which explicitly involves the

**expectations**thatothers have about one ' s behavior , as well as one ' s

**expectations**about howothers will behave toward him , can in part be interpreted in terms of the stability

of ...

Page 281

duced from the rationality of the players '

rationality of the two players jointly and ... If two players confidently believe they

share , and do share , the

is not ...

duced from the rationality of the players '

**expectations**, we can consider therationality of the two players jointly and ... If two players confidently believe they

share , and do share , the

**expectation**of a particular outcome , and that outcomeis not ...

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#### LibraryThing Review

User Review - HadriantheBlind - LibraryThingThis is one of the most important books on Game Theory, and also, thankfully, one of the more accessible (certainly much more so than von Neumann's and Morgenstern's book). His main theses are that ... Read full review

### Contents

Bargaining Communication and Limited | 3 |

Toward a Theory of Interdependent Decision | 83 |

Enforcement Communication and Strategic | 119 |

Copyright | |

9 other sections not shown

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### Common terms and phrases

action advantage agree agreement alternative assume attack bargaining become behavior better carry chance Chapter choice choose Column commitment communication concert consider cooperative coordination cost course decision depends deterrence effect enemy enforcement evidence example expectations fact final forces gain game theory give given identify important incentive initial interest involved keep kind knows least leave less limited mathematical matrix matter means meet move mutual negotiation nuclear objective offer one's original other's outcome pair particular party payoff perhaps person play players position possible potential preference present principle probability problem promise pure question random rational reach reason recognize reduce relation requires retaliation risk role rules Russians seems sense side situation solution strategy strike structure suggestion suppose surprise symmetry tacit tactic third threat threaten tion weapons yield