## The strategy of conflict |

### From inside the book

Results 1-3 of 13

Page 186

If he offers Column a 50-50 chance between rows i and ii, Column gets an

This leaves Row an

If he offers Column a 50-50 chance between rows i and ii, Column gets an

**expected value**of 2 in the first column, of 1.5 in the second, and chooses the first.This leaves Row an

**expected value**of 2.5. Since Row has a preference for ii, ...Page 215

The limits to the values of our two parameters, Pr and Pc, beyond which they

make the situation unstable and provoke joint ... Suppose, now, that the

probability of achieving surprise, and thereby winning, is only Q, so that the

The limits to the values of our two parameters, Pr and Pc, beyond which they

make the situation unstable and provoke joint ... Suppose, now, that the

probability of achieving surprise, and thereby winning, is only Q, so that the

**expected value**to ...Page 299

If his response is fairly insensitive to variations in that particular payoff as long as

it is positive, and if nevertheless he attaches a high value to the game with some

positive payoff and attaches something like a random-strategy

If his response is fairly insensitive to variations in that particular payoff as long as

it is positive, and if nevertheless he attaches a high value to the game with some

positive payoff and attaches something like a random-strategy

**expected value**...### What people are saying - Write a review

#### LibraryThing Review

User Review - HadriantheBlind - LibraryThingThis is one of the most important books on Game Theory, and also, thankfully, one of the more accessible (certainly much more so than von Neumann's and Morgenstern's book). His main theses are that ... Read full review

### Contents

The Retarded Science of International Strategy | 3 |

An Essay on Bargaining | 21 |

Bargaining Communication and Limited War | 53 |

Copyright | |

10 other sections not shown

### Other editions - View all

### Common terms and phrases

action advantage adversary agreement all-out balance of terror bargaining game behavior Bernard Brodie bilateral monopoly cell chance Chapter choice choose clue Column commitment communication concert conflict cooperative game coordination coordination game decision depends deterrence enemy enforcement evidence example expected value game theory identify incentive initial interest involved John Harsanyi jointly kind knows likelihood limited Luce and Raiffa mathematical matrix means military minimax missiles mixed strategies motive move mutual Nash Nash point negotiation no-attack nonzero-sum game nuclear weapons offer one's other's outcome pair participants particular partner party payoff payoff matrix penalty play possible potential preference principle probability problem promise pure Quemoy random rational players recognize retaliation retaliatory forces risk role Row's rules Russians side situation solution stable strategy strike suggestion suppose surprise attack symmetry tacit bargaining tacit game tactic threat threaten tion tive value system yield zero-sum game