The Strategy of Conflict'In eminently lucid and often charming language, Professor Schelling's work opens to rational analysis a crucial field of politics, the international politics of threat, or as the current term goes, of deterrence. In this field, the author's analysis goes beyond what has been done by earlier writers. It is the best, most incisive, and most stimulating book on the subject.' |
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Page 238
... fact deterred . From that point of view , we perhaps should not even wish that we alone could have the " invulnerable " nuclear - weapon submarine ; if in fact we have either no intention or no political capacity for a first strike , it ...
... fact deterred . From that point of view , we perhaps should not even wish that we alone could have the " invulnerable " nuclear - weapon submarine ; if in fact we have either no intention or no political capacity for a first strike , it ...
Page 247
... fact be conveyed in a believable way in time to prevent the other side's mistaken decision . MISAPPREHENSION OF ... fact we were not but they thought we might be ? How might they prove to us that they were not initiating a surprise ...
... fact be conveyed in a believable way in time to prevent the other side's mistaken decision . MISAPPREHENSION OF ... fact we were not but they thought we might be ? How might they prove to us that they were not initiating a surprise ...
Page 262
... fact that limits are generally found by a process of tacit maneuver and negotiation . They are jockeyed for , rather than negotiated ex- plicitly . But if the two sides must strike a " bargain " without explicit communication , the ...
... fact that limits are generally found by a process of tacit maneuver and negotiation . They are jockeyed for , rather than negotiated ex- plicitly . But if the two sides must strike a " bargain " without explicit communication , the ...
Contents
The Retarded Science of International Strategy | 3 |
An Essay on Bargaining | 21 |
Bargaining Communication and Limited War | 53 |
Copyright | |
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Common terms and phrases
action advantage adversary agreement all-out balance of terror bargaining game behavior cell chance Chapter choice choose clue Column commitment communication concert conflict cooperative game coordination coordination game decision depends deterrence enemy enforcement evidence example expected value game theory identify incentive initial interest involved John Harsanyi jointly kind knows likelihood limited limited war Luce and Raiffa mathematical matrix means military minimax missiles mixed strategies move mutual Nash Nash point negotiation no-attack nonzero-sum game nuclear weapons offer one's other's outcome pair participants particular partner party payoff payoff matrix penalty play possible potential preference principle probability problem promise pure Quemoy random rational players recognize retaliation retaliatory forces risk role Row's rules Russians side situation solution stable strategy strike structure suggestion suppose surprise attack symmetry tacit bargaining tacit game tactic threat threaten tion tive value system yield zero-sum game