## The Strategy of ConflictNo background in mathematics needed, but some knowledge of game theory useful. |

### From inside the book

Results 1-3 of 65

Page 110

... situation and ( b ) that their reactions are subject to a mutual interaction that

results from the

his own visible reaction is yielding information about his own expectations .

... situation and ( b ) that their reactions are subject to a mutual interaction that

results from the

**fact**that each can see the other ' s reaction and each knows thathis own visible reaction is yielding information about his own expectations .

Page 124

The

must lie behind the threat and be successfully communicated to the threatened

party is in contradiction to another notion that often appears in game theory . This

is ...

The

**fact**that some kind of commitment , or at least appearance of commitment ,must lie behind the threat and be successfully communicated to the threatened

party is in contradiction to another notion that often appears in game theory . This

is ...

Page 247

But in the case of “ inadvertent war , ” both sides have a strong interest in

conveying the truth if the truth can in

to prevent the other side ' s mistaken decision . MISAPPREHENSION OF

ATTACK ...

But in the case of “ inadvertent war , ” both sides have a strong interest in

conveying the truth if the truth can in

**fact**be conveyed in a believable way in timeto prevent the other side ' s mistaken decision . MISAPPREHENSION OF

ATTACK ...

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#### LibraryThing Review

User Review - HadriantheBlind - LibraryThingThis is one of the most important books on Game Theory, and also, thankfully, one of the more accessible (certainly much more so than von Neumann's and Morgenstern's book). His main theses are that ... Read full review

### Contents

Bargaining Communication and Limited | 3 |

Toward a Theory of Interdependent Decision | 83 |

Enforcement Communication and Strategic | 119 |

Copyright | |

9 other sections not shown

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### Common terms and phrases

action advantage agree agreement alternative assume attack bargaining become behavior better carry chance Chapter choice choose Column commitment communication concert consider cooperative coordination cost course decision depends deterrence effect enemy enforcement evidence example expectations fact final forces gain game theory give given identify important incentive initial interest involved keep kind knows least leave less limited mathematical matrix matter means meet move mutual negotiation nuclear objective offer one's original other's outcome pair particular party payoff perhaps person play players position possible potential preference present principle probability problem promise pure question random rational reach reason recognize reduce relation requires retaliation risk role rules Russians seems sense side situation solution strategy strike structure suggestion suppose surprise symmetry tacit tactic third threat threaten tion weapons yield