The Strategy of Conflict'In eminently lucid and often charming language, Professor Schelling's work opens to rational analysis a crucial field of politics, the international politics of threat, or as the current term goes, of deterrence. In this field, the author's analysis goes beyond what has been done by earlier writers. It is the best, most incisive, and most stimulating book on the subject.' |
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Page 76
... forces of China , not solely because water favored the defender and inhibited at- tack , but because an island is an integral unit and water is a conspicuous boundary . The sacrifice of any part of the island would have made the ...
... forces of China , not solely because water favored the defender and inhibited at- tack , but because an island is an integral unit and water is a conspicuous boundary . The sacrifice of any part of the island would have made the ...
Page 233
... forces . If these forces were them- selves invulnerable — if each side were confident that its own forces could survive an attack , but also that it could not destroy the other's power to strike back there would be no powerful ...
... forces . If these forces were them- selves invulnerable — if each side were confident that its own forces could survive an attack , but also that it could not destroy the other's power to strike back there would be no powerful ...
Page 235
... force might be more than enough to guarantee the Russians a prohibitive cost in retaliation . Similarly , a defense of ... forces the separation of each side's missile sites from the other's , by reducing accuracy , might make a real ...
... force might be more than enough to guarantee the Russians a prohibitive cost in retaliation . Similarly , a defense of ... forces the separation of each side's missile sites from the other's , by reducing accuracy , might make a real ...
Contents
The Retarded Science of International Strategy | 3 |
An Essay on Bargaining | 21 |
Bargaining Communication and Limited War | 53 |
Copyright | |
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Common terms and phrases
action advantage adversary agreement all-out balance of terror bargaining game behavior cell chance Chapter choice choose clue Column commitment communication concert conflict cooperative game coordination coordination game decision depends deterrence enemy enforcement evidence example expected value game theory identify incentive initial interest involved John Harsanyi jointly kind knows likelihood limited limited war Luce and Raiffa mathematical matrix means military minimax missiles mixed strategies move mutual Nash Nash point negotiation no-attack nonzero-sum game nuclear weapons offer one's other's outcome pair participants particular partner party payoff payoff matrix penalty play possible potential preference principle probability problem promise pure Quemoy random rational players recognize retaliation retaliatory forces risk role Row's rules Russians side situation solution stable strategy strike structure suggestion suppose surprise attack symmetry tacit bargaining tacit game tactic threat threaten tion tive value system yield zero-sum game