## The Strategy of ConflictNo background in mathematics needed, but some knowledge of game theory useful. |

### From inside the book

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Page v

Strictly speaking, the subject falls within the theory of games, but within the part of

situations in which there is common interest as well as conflict between

adversaries: ...

Strictly speaking, the subject falls within the theory of games, but within the part of

**game theory**in which the least satisfactory progress has been made, thesituations in which there is common interest as well as conflict between

adversaries: ...

Page 83

4 TOWARD A THEORY OF INTERDEPENDENT DECISION On the strategy of

pure conflict — the zero-sum games —

and advice. But on the strategy of action where conflict is mixed with mutual ...

4 TOWARD A THEORY OF INTERDEPENDENT DECISION On the strategy of

pure conflict — the zero-sum games —

**game theory**has yielded important insightand advice. But on the strategy of action where conflict is mixed with mutual ...

Page 119

Yet formal

The author suggests that nonzero-sum

promising field by being pitched at too abstract a level of analysis. By abstracting

from ...

Yet formal

**game theory**has contributed little to the clarification of these ideas.The author suggests that nonzero-sum

**game theory**may have missed its mostpromising field by being pitched at too abstract a level of analysis. By abstracting

from ...

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#### LibraryThing Review

User Review - HadriantheBlind - LibraryThingThis is one of the most important books on Game Theory, and also, thankfully, one of the more accessible (certainly much more so than von Neumann's and Morgenstern's book). His main theses are that ... Read full review

### Contents

Bargaining Communication and Limited | 3 |

Toward a Theory of Interdependent Decision | 83 |

Enforcement Communication and Strategic | 119 |

Copyright | |

9 other sections not shown

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### Common terms and phrases

action advantage agree agreement alternative assume attack bargaining become behavior better carry chance Chapter choice choose Column commitment communication concert consider cooperative coordination cost course decision depends deterrence effect enemy enforcement evidence example expectations fact final forces gain game theory give given identify important incentive initial interest involved keep kind knows least leave less limited mathematical matrix matter means meet move mutual negotiation nuclear objective offer one's original other's outcome pair particular party payoff perhaps person play players position possible potential preference present principle probability problem promise pure question random rational reach reason recognize reduce relation requires retaliation risk role rules Russians seems sense side situation solution strategy strike structure suggestion suppose surprise symmetry tacit tactic third threat threaten tion weapons yield