The Strategy of Conflict'In eminently lucid and often charming language, Professor Schelling's work opens to rational analysis a crucial field of politics, the international politics of threat, or as the current term goes, of deterrence. In this field, the author's analysis goes beyond what has been done by earlier writers. It is the best, most incisive, and most stimulating book on the subject.' |
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Page 90
... identify certain qualities of the mixed game that appear most clearly in the limiting case of pure coordination ... identifying partners and con- certing plans with them — is a significant phenomenon . A good example is the formation of ...
... identify certain qualities of the mixed game that appear most clearly in the limiting case of pure coordination ... identifying partners and con- certing plans with them — is a significant phenomenon . A good example is the formation of ...
Page 140
... identify each other , there being severe penalties in the event that either should declare his intentions to someone who proved not to have identical interests . The boy who is afraid to ask a girl for a date because she might rebuff ...
... identify each other , there being severe penalties in the event that either should declare his intentions to someone who proved not to have identical interests . The boy who is afraid to ask a girl for a date because she might rebuff ...
Page 141
Thomas C. Schelling. cards was to identify the motorist as a person who , if the bribe was received , would keep quiet . It identified the motorist as a man whose promise was enforcible . But the card identifies the motorist only after ...
Thomas C. Schelling. cards was to identify the motorist as a person who , if the bribe was received , would keep quiet . It identified the motorist as a man whose promise was enforcible . But the card identifies the motorist only after ...
Contents
The Retarded Science of International Strategy | 3 |
An Essay on Bargaining | 21 |
Bargaining Communication and Limited War | 53 |
Copyright | |
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Common terms and phrases
action advantage adversary agreement all-out balance of terror bargaining game behavior cell chance Chapter choice choose clue Column commitment communication concert conflict cooperative game coordination coordination game decision depends deterrence enemy enforcement evidence example expected value game theory identify incentive initial interest involved John Harsanyi jointly kind knows likelihood limited limited war Luce and Raiffa mathematical matrix means military minimax missiles mixed strategies move mutual Nash Nash point negotiation no-attack nonzero-sum game nuclear weapons offer one's other's outcome pair participants particular partner party payoff payoff matrix penalty play possible potential preference principle probability problem promise pure Quemoy random rational players recognize retaliation retaliatory forces risk role Row's rules Russians side situation solution stable strategy strike structure suggestion suppose surprise attack symmetry tacit bargaining tacit game tactic threat threaten tion tive value system yield zero-sum game