The Strategy of Conflict'In eminently lucid and often charming language, Professor Schelling's work opens to rational analysis a crucial field of politics, the international politics of threat, or as the current term goes, of deterrence. In this field, the author's analysis goes beyond what has been done by earlier writers. It is the best, most incisive, and most stimulating book on the subject.' |
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Page 11
... involved ; it is as inapplicable to a situation of pure and com- plete antagonism of interest as it is to the case of pure and complete common interest . Between these extremes , deterring an ally and deterring an enemy differ only by ...
... involved ; it is as inapplicable to a situation of pure and com- plete antagonism of interest as it is to the case of pure and complete common interest . Between these extremes , deterring an ally and deterring an enemy differ only by ...
Page 89
... involved in wars , strikes , negotiations , and so forth , requires a more ambivalent term . In the rest of this paper I shall refer to the mixed game as a bargaining game or mixed - motive game , since these terms seem to catch the ...
... involved in wars , strikes , negotiations , and so forth , requires a more ambivalent term . In the rest of this paper I shall refer to the mixed game as a bargaining game or mixed - motive game , since these terms seem to catch the ...
Page 108
... involved in the convergence of expectations must depend on similar restraints at least as rigorous . And , since the nonzero - sum game requires some ultimate joint “ organ- ization of form , " so to speak , a normative theory of ...
... involved in the convergence of expectations must depend on similar restraints at least as rigorous . And , since the nonzero - sum game requires some ultimate joint “ organ- ization of form , " so to speak , a normative theory of ...
Contents
The Retarded Science of International Strategy | 3 |
An Essay on Bargaining | 21 |
Bargaining Communication and Limited War | 53 |
Copyright | |
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Common terms and phrases
action advantage adversary agreement all-out balance of terror bargaining game behavior cell chance Chapter choice choose clue Column commitment communication concert conflict cooperative game coordination coordination game decision depends deterrence enemy enforcement evidence example expected value game theory identify incentive initial interest involved John Harsanyi jointly kind knows likelihood limited limited war Luce and Raiffa mathematical matrix means military minimax missiles mixed strategies move mutual Nash Nash point negotiation no-attack nonzero-sum game nuclear weapons offer one's other's outcome pair participants particular partner party payoff payoff matrix penalty play possible potential preference principle probability problem promise pure Quemoy random rational players recognize retaliation retaliatory forces risk role Row's rules Russians side situation solution stable strategy strike structure suggestion suppose surprise attack symmetry tacit bargaining tacit game tactic threat threaten tion tive value system yield zero-sum game