The Strategy of Conflict'In eminently lucid and often charming language, Professor Schelling's work opens to rational analysis a crucial field of politics, the international politics of threat, or as the current term goes, of deterrence. In this field, the author's analysis goes beyond what has been done by earlier writers. It is the best, most incisive, and most stimulating book on the subject.' |
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Page 286
... jointly found and jointly acted on in the interest of an outcome that is jointly far superior to any symmetrical outcome . Luce and Raiffa conclude their discussion of this particular game with the remark that " although this seemingly ...
... jointly found and jointly acted on in the interest of an outcome that is jointly far superior to any symmetrical outcome . Luce and Raiffa conclude their discussion of this particular game with the remark that " although this seemingly ...
Page 291
... jointly admissible strategy pairs . ( 2 ) All jointly admissible equi- librium pairs are both interchangeable and equivalent . " 2 1 " Noncooperative " is the traditional name for the game without overt com- munication . Unfortunately ...
... jointly admissible strategy pairs . ( 2 ) All jointly admissible equi- librium pairs are both interchangeable and equivalent . " 2 1 " Noncooperative " is the traditional name for the game without overt com- munication . Unfortunately ...
Page 300
... jointly to achieve an efficient outcome in the face of conflicting preferences.8 Here again the most potent clues may be those that we admit when we go beyond the mathematics of the payoff matrix . If we are driving toward the same ...
... jointly to achieve an efficient outcome in the face of conflicting preferences.8 Here again the most potent clues may be those that we admit when we go beyond the mathematics of the payoff matrix . If we are driving toward the same ...
Contents
The Retarded Science of International Strategy | 3 |
An Essay on Bargaining | 21 |
Bargaining Communication and Limited War | 53 |
Copyright | |
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Common terms and phrases
action advantage adversary agreement all-out balance of terror bargaining game behavior cell chance Chapter choice choose clue Column commitment communication concert conflict cooperative game coordination coordination game decision depends deterrence enemy enforcement evidence example expected value game theory identify incentive initial interest involved John Harsanyi jointly kind knows likelihood limited limited war Luce and Raiffa mathematical matrix means military minimax missiles mixed strategies move mutual Nash Nash point negotiation no-attack nonzero-sum game nuclear weapons offer one's other's outcome pair participants particular partner party payoff payoff matrix penalty play possible potential preference principle probability problem promise pure Quemoy random rational players recognize retaliation retaliatory forces risk role Row's rules Russians side situation solution stable strategy strike structure suggestion suppose surprise attack symmetry tacit bargaining tacit game tactic threat threaten tion tive value system yield zero-sum game