## The Strategy of ConflictNo background in mathematics needed, but some knowledge of game theory useful. |

### From inside the book

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Page 70

In such a situation any potential outcome is one from which at

parties , and probably both , would have been willing to retreat for the sake of

agreement , and very often the other party knows it . Any potential outcome is

therefore ...

In such a situation any potential outcome is one from which at

**least**one of theparties , and probably both , would have been willing to retreat for the sake of

agreement , and very often the other party knows it . Any potential outcome is

therefore ...

Page 88

In the mixed game , or bargaining situation , at

denote a negative slope and at

the game makes it desirable for a player to use a random device in the choice of

his ...

In the mixed game , or bargaining situation , at

**least**one pair of points woulddenote a negative slope and at

**least**one pair a positive slope . 4 • If the nature ofthe game makes it desirable for a player to use a random device in the choice of

his ...

Page 265

A third conclusion is that on the occasion of their first use we should perhaps be

at

with the “ nuclear role ” that we adopt , as with the original objectives of ...

A third conclusion is that on the occasion of their first use we should perhaps be

at

**least**as concerned with the patterns and precedents that we establish , andwith the “ nuclear role ” that we adopt , as with the original objectives of ...

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#### LibraryThing Review

User Review - HadriantheBlind - LibraryThingThis is one of the most important books on Game Theory, and also, thankfully, one of the more accessible (certainly much more so than von Neumann's and Morgenstern's book). His main theses are that ... Read full review

### Contents

Bargaining Communication and Limited | 3 |

Toward a Theory of Interdependent Decision | 83 |

Enforcement Communication and Strategic | 119 |

Copyright | |

9 other sections not shown

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### Common terms and phrases

action advantage agree agreement alternative assume attack bargaining become behavior better carry chance Chapter choice choose Column commitment communication concert consider cooperative coordination cost course decision depends deterrence effect enemy enforcement evidence example expectations fact final forces gain game theory give given identify important incentive initial interest involved keep kind knows least leave less limited mathematical matrix matter means meet move mutual negotiation nuclear objective offer one's original other's outcome pair particular party payoff perhaps person play players position possible potential preference present principle probability problem promise pure question random rational reach reason recognize reduce relation requires retaliation risk role rules Russians seems sense side situation solution strategy strike structure suggestion suppose surprise symmetry tacit tactic third threat threaten tion weapons yield