The Strategy of Conflict'In eminently lucid and often charming language, Professor Schelling's work opens to rational analysis a crucial field of politics, the international politics of threat, or as the current term goes, of deterrence. In this field, the author's analysis goes beyond what has been done by earlier writers. It is the best, most incisive, and most stimulating book on the subject.' |
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Page 78
... likelihood of mutual destruction in case it comes . Why ? Be- cause of the strategy of threats , bluffs , and deterrents . The will- ingness to start a war or take steps that may lead to war , whether aggression or retaliation to ...
... likelihood of mutual destruction in case it comes . Why ? Be- cause of the strategy of threats , bluffs , and deterrents . The will- ingness to start a war or take steps that may lead to war , whether aggression or retaliation to ...
Page 219
... likelihood of shoot- ing as a function of nervousness , and have a simple pair of simul- taneous differential equations that seem to yield precisely the kind of phenomenon we started off to study.8 And the reason they do is that this ...
... likelihood of shoot- ing as a function of nervousness , and have a simple pair of simul- taneous differential equations that seem to yield precisely the kind of phenomenon we started off to study.8 And the reason they do is that this ...
Page 221
... likelihood of a failure to respond , and hence in the direc- tion of greater likelihood of a false alarm that provokes one's own " retaliation . " If each player's response to an increased danger of surprise attack is to enhance his own ...
... likelihood of a failure to respond , and hence in the direc- tion of greater likelihood of a false alarm that provokes one's own " retaliation . " If each player's response to an increased danger of surprise attack is to enhance his own ...
Contents
The Retarded Science of International Strategy | 3 |
An Essay on Bargaining | 21 |
Bargaining Communication and Limited War | 53 |
Copyright | |
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Common terms and phrases
action advantage adversary agreement all-out balance of terror bargaining game behavior cell chance Chapter choice choose clue Column commitment communication concert conflict cooperative game coordination coordination game decision depends deterrence enemy enforcement evidence example expected value game theory identify incentive initial interest involved John Harsanyi jointly kind knows likelihood limited limited war Luce and Raiffa mathematical matrix means military minimax missiles mixed strategies move mutual Nash Nash point negotiation no-attack nonzero-sum game nuclear weapons offer one's other's outcome pair participants particular partner party payoff payoff matrix penalty play possible potential preference principle probability problem promise pure Quemoy random rational players recognize retaliation retaliatory forces risk role Row's rules Russians side situation solution stable strategy strike structure suggestion suppose surprise attack symmetry tacit bargaining tacit game tactic threat threaten tion tive value system yield zero-sum game