The Strategy of Conflict'In eminently lucid and often charming language, Professor Schelling's work opens to rational analysis a crucial field of politics, the international politics of threat, or as the current term goes, of deterrence. In this field, the author's analysis goes beyond what has been done by earlier writers. It is the best, most incisive, and most stimulating book on the subject.' |
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Page 113
... Mathematical Foci . We must avoid assuming that everything the analyst can perceive is perceived by the participants in a game , or that whatever exerts power of sug- gestion on the analyst does so on the participant in a game . In ...
... Mathematical Foci . We must avoid assuming that everything the analyst can perceive is perceived by the participants in a game , or that whatever exerts power of sug- gestion on the analyst does so on the participant in a game . In ...
Page 284
... mathematical symmetry is a sufficient rule and a supremely help- ful one in concerting on a common choice . And it may be possible to set up a game in such sanitary fashion , suppressing the identity of players and all contextual ...
... mathematical symmetry is a sufficient rule and a supremely help- ful one in concerting on a common choice . And it may be possible to set up a game in such sanitary fashion , suppressing the identity of players and all contextual ...
Page 285
... mathematical structure of the game but are part of the " topical content " ; that is , they usually depend on the " labeling " of players and strategies , to use the term of Luce and Raiffa mentioned in Chapter 4. ) I have no basis for ...
... mathematical structure of the game but are part of the " topical content " ; that is , they usually depend on the " labeling " of players and strategies , to use the term of Luce and Raiffa mentioned in Chapter 4. ) I have no basis for ...
Contents
The Retarded Science of International Strategy | 3 |
An Essay on Bargaining | 21 |
Bargaining Communication and Limited War | 53 |
Copyright | |
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Common terms and phrases
action advantage adversary agreement all-out balance of terror bargaining game behavior cell chance Chapter choice choose clue Column commitment communication concert conflict cooperative game coordination coordination game decision depends deterrence enemy enforcement evidence example expected value game theory identify incentive initial interest involved John Harsanyi jointly kind knows likelihood limited limited war Luce and Raiffa mathematical matrix means military minimax missiles mixed strategies move mutual Nash Nash point negotiation no-attack nonzero-sum game nuclear weapons offer one's other's outcome pair participants particular partner party payoff payoff matrix penalty play possible potential preference principle probability problem promise pure Quemoy random rational players recognize retaliation retaliatory forces risk role Row's rules Russians side situation solution stable strategy strike structure suggestion suppose surprise attack symmetry tacit bargaining tacit game tactic threat threaten tion tive value system yield zero-sum game