## The Strategy of ConflictNo background in mathematics needed, but some knowledge of game theory useful. |

### From inside the book

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Page 150

INCORPORATION OF MOVES IN A GAME

a game has potential moves like threats, commitments, and promises that are

susceptible of formal analysis, it must be possible to represent such moves in the

...

INCORPORATION OF MOVES IN A GAME

**MATRIX**One is led to suppose that, ifa game has potential moves like threats, commitments, and promises that are

susceptible of formal analysis, it must be possible to represent such moves in the

...

Page 212

We work this problem by recomputing the pay-offs in the original

two parameters representing the probability of "irrational" attack. The upper left

cell in the

...

We work this problem by recomputing the pay-offs in the original

**matrix**, using thetwo parameters representing the probability of "irrational" attack. The upper left

cell in the

**matrix**stays as it was. The lower right cell has its pay-offs recomputed,...

Page 225

(Actually, stability of the

behavior equilibrium, is not a relevant concept for the parametric-behavior

hypothesis ; to contemplate the

project his ...

(Actually, stability of the

**matrix**game, as distinct from stability of a parametric-behavior equilibrium, is not a relevant concept for the parametric-behavior

hypothesis ; to contemplate the

**matrix**and to anticipate the other's action is toproject his ...

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#### LibraryThing Review

User Review - HadriantheBlind - LibraryThingThis is one of the most important books on Game Theory, and also, thankfully, one of the more accessible (certainly much more so than von Neumann's and Morgenstern's book). His main theses are that ... Read full review

### Contents

Bargaining Communication and Limited | 3 |

Toward a Theory of Interdependent Decision | 83 |

Enforcement Communication and Strategic | 119 |

Copyright | |

9 other sections not shown

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### Common terms and phrases

action advantage agree agreement alternative assume attack bargaining become behavior better carry chance Chapter choice choose Column commitment communication concert consider cooperative coordination cost course decision depends deterrence effect enemy enforcement evidence example expectations fact final forces gain game theory give given identify important incentive initial interest involved keep kind knows least leave less limited mathematical matrix matter means meet move mutual negotiation nuclear objective offer one's original other's outcome pair particular party payoff perhaps person play players position possible potential preference present principle probability problem promise pure question random rational reach reason recognize reduce relation requires retaliation risk role rules Russians seems sense side situation solution strategy strike structure suggestion suppose surprise symmetry tacit tactic third threat threaten tion weapons yield