## The Strategy of ConflictNo background in mathematics needed, but some knowledge of game theory useful. |

### From inside the book

Results 1-3 of 29

Page 54

TACIT COORDINATION ( COMMON INTERESTS ) When a man loses his wife in

a department store without any prior understanding on where to

separated , the chances are good that they will find each other . It is likely that ...

TACIT COORDINATION ( COMMON INTERESTS ) When a man loses his wife in

a department store without any prior understanding on where to

**meet**if they getseparated , the chances are good that they will find each other . It is likely that ...

Page 56

You are to

where to

you will ...

You are to

**meet**somebody in New York City . You have not been instructedwhere to

**meet**; you have no prior understanding with the person on where to**meet**; and you cannot communicate with each other . You are simply told thatyou will ...

Page 58

nence that depends on time and place and who the people are . Ordinary folk lost

on a plane circular area may naturally go to the center to

only one versed in mathematics would " naturally ” expect to

nence that depends on time and place and who the people are . Ordinary folk lost

on a plane circular area may naturally go to the center to

**meet**each other ; butonly one versed in mathematics would " naturally ” expect to

**meet**his partner at ...### What people are saying - Write a review

#### LibraryThing Review

User Review - HadriantheBlind - LibraryThingThis is one of the most important books on Game Theory, and also, thankfully, one of the more accessible (certainly much more so than von Neumann's and Morgenstern's book). His main theses are that ... Read full review

### Contents

Bargaining Communication and Limited | 3 |

Toward a Theory of Interdependent Decision | 83 |

Enforcement Communication and Strategic | 119 |

Copyright | |

9 other sections not shown

### Other editions - View all

### Common terms and phrases

action advantage agree agreement alternative assume attack bargaining become behavior better carry chance Chapter choice choose Column commitment communication concert consider cooperative coordination cost course decision depends deterrence effect enemy enforcement evidence example expectations fact final forces gain game theory give given identify important incentive initial interest involved keep kind knows least leave less limited mathematical matrix matter means meet move mutual negotiation nuclear objective offer one's original other's outcome pair particular party payoff perhaps person play players position possible potential preference present principle probability problem promise pure question random rational reach reason recognize reduce relation requires retaliation risk role rules Russians seems sense side situation solution strategy strike structure suggestion suppose surprise symmetry tacit tactic third threat threaten tion weapons yield