The Strategy of Conflict'In eminently lucid and often charming language, Professor Schelling's work opens to rational analysis a crucial field of politics, the international politics of threat, or as the current term goes, of deterrence. In this field, the author's analysis goes beyond what has been done by earlier writers. It is the best, most incisive, and most stimulating book on the subject.' |
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Page 96
... minimax " solution , randomized if neces- sary , in the zero - sum game . In the pure - coordination game , the player's objective is to make contact with the other player through some imaginative process of introspection , of searching ...
... minimax " solution , randomized if neces- sary , in the zero - sum game . In the pure - coordination game , the player's objective is to make contact with the other player through some imaginative process of introspection , of searching ...
Page 105
... minimax solution is striking here . With a minimax solution , a zero - sum game is reduced to a completely unilateral affair . One not only does not need to communicate with his opponent , he does not even need to know who the opponent ...
... minimax solution is striking here . With a minimax solution , a zero - sum game is reduced to a completely unilateral affair . One not only does not need to communicate with his opponent , he does not even need to know who the opponent ...
Page 175
... minimax - maximin equilibrium pair ( " solu- tion " ) if mixed strategies are allowed , said , " As far as I can see , there could be no theory of games on these bases without that theorem . . . . Throughout the period in question I ...
... minimax - maximin equilibrium pair ( " solu- tion " ) if mixed strategies are allowed , said , " As far as I can see , there could be no theory of games on these bases without that theorem . . . . Throughout the period in question I ...
Contents
The Retarded Science of International Strategy | 3 |
An Essay on Bargaining | 21 |
Bargaining Communication and Limited War | 53 |
Copyright | |
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Common terms and phrases
action advantage adversary agreement all-out balance of terror bargaining game behavior cell chance Chapter choice choose clue Column commitment communication concert conflict cooperative game coordination coordination game decision depends deterrence enemy enforcement evidence example expected value game theory identify incentive initial interest involved John Harsanyi jointly kind knows likelihood limited limited war Luce and Raiffa mathematical matrix means military minimax missiles mixed strategies move mutual Nash Nash point negotiation no-attack nonzero-sum game nuclear weapons offer one's other's outcome pair participants particular partner party payoff payoff matrix penalty play possible potential preference principle probability problem promise pure Quemoy random rational players recognize retaliation retaliatory forces risk role Row's rules Russians side situation solution stable strategy strike structure suggestion suppose surprise attack symmetry tacit bargaining tacit game tactic threat threaten tion tive value system yield zero-sum game