The Strategy of Conflict'In eminently lucid and often charming language, Professor Schelling's work opens to rational analysis a crucial field of politics, the international politics of threat, or as the current term goes, of deterrence. In this field, the author's analysis goes beyond what has been done by earlier writers. It is the best, most incisive, and most stimulating book on the subject.' |
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Page 99
... motive game ( In Appendix C it is argued that certain solution concepts familiar in game theory can be given an interpretation in terms of the coordination concept . ) r S 1 P SUGGESTION AND MUTUAL PERCEPTION IN THE MIXED - MOTIVE GAME ...
... motive game ( In Appendix C it is argued that certain solution concepts familiar in game theory can be given an interpretation in terms of the coordination concept . ) r S 1 P SUGGESTION AND MUTUAL PERCEPTION IN THE MIXED - MOTIVE GAME ...
Page 250
... motive to provide it - the greater urgency of reaching an understanding or an agreement that depends on may be enhanced in such an emergency . it - OVERBUILDING THE SYSTEM For the purpose of being at least somewhat prepared for crises ...
... motive to provide it - the greater urgency of reaching an understanding or an agreement that depends on may be enhanced in such an emergency . it - OVERBUILDING THE SYSTEM For the purpose of being at least somewhat prepared for crises ...
Page 298
... motives for choosing it , even if only to make sure that the concept is operational . As between the two motives mentioned the " insurance " motive and the " coordination - clue " motive we might distinguish as follows . We offer a ...
... motives for choosing it , even if only to make sure that the concept is operational . As between the two motives mentioned the " insurance " motive and the " coordination - clue " motive we might distinguish as follows . We offer a ...
Contents
The Retarded Science of International Strategy | 3 |
An Essay on Bargaining | 21 |
Bargaining Communication and Limited War | 53 |
Copyright | |
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Common terms and phrases
action advantage adversary agreement all-out balance of terror bargaining game behavior cell chance Chapter choice choose clue Column commitment communication concert conflict cooperative game coordination coordination game decision depends deterrence enemy enforcement evidence example expected value game theory identify incentive initial interest involved John Harsanyi jointly kind knows likelihood limited limited war Luce and Raiffa mathematical matrix means military minimax missiles mixed strategies move mutual Nash Nash point negotiation no-attack nonzero-sum game nuclear weapons offer one's other's outcome pair participants particular partner party payoff payoff matrix penalty play possible potential preference principle probability problem promise pure Quemoy random rational players recognize retaliation retaliatory forces risk role Row's rules Russians side situation solution stable strategy strike structure suggestion suppose surprise attack symmetry tacit bargaining tacit game tactic threat threaten tion tive value system yield zero-sum game