The Strategy of Conflict'In eminently lucid and often charming language, Professor Schelling's work opens to rational analysis a crucial field of politics, the international politics of threat, or as the current term goes, of deterrence. In this field, the author's analysis goes beyond what has been done by earlier writers. It is the best, most incisive, and most stimulating book on the subject.' |
From inside the book
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Page 5
... mutual accommodation is as important and dramatic as the element of conflict . Concepts like deterrence , limited war , and disarmament , as well as negotiation , are concerned with the common interest and mutual dependence that can ...
... mutual accommodation is as important and dramatic as the element of conflict . Concepts like deterrence , limited war , and disarmament , as well as negotiation , are concerned with the common interest and mutual dependence that can ...
Page 83
... mutual dependence is part of the logical structure and demands some kind of collabora- tion or mutual accommodation- tacit , if not explicit even if only in the avoidance of mutual disaster . These are also games in which , though ...
... mutual dependence is part of the logical structure and demands some kind of collabora- tion or mutual accommodation- tacit , if not explicit even if only in the avoidance of mutual disaster . These are also games in which , though ...
Page 108
... mutual damage , assume he will co - operate.18 ― 18 It should be added that the concept of the intrinsic magnetism ... mutual perception " and " mutual organization of forms " involved in the convergence of expectations must depend on ...
... mutual damage , assume he will co - operate.18 ― 18 It should be added that the concept of the intrinsic magnetism ... mutual perception " and " mutual organization of forms " involved in the convergence of expectations must depend on ...
Contents
The Retarded Science of International Strategy | 3 |
An Essay on Bargaining | 21 |
Bargaining Communication and Limited War | 53 |
Copyright | |
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Common terms and phrases
action advantage adversary agreement all-out balance of terror bargaining game behavior cell chance Chapter choice choose clue Column commitment communication concert conflict cooperative game coordination coordination game decision depends deterrence enemy enforcement evidence example expected value game theory identify incentive initial interest involved John Harsanyi jointly kind knows likelihood limited limited war Luce and Raiffa mathematical matrix means military minimax missiles mixed strategies move mutual Nash Nash point negotiation no-attack nonzero-sum game nuclear weapons offer one's other's outcome pair participants particular partner party payoff payoff matrix penalty play possible potential preference principle probability problem promise pure Quemoy random rational players recognize retaliation retaliatory forces risk role Row's rules Russians side situation solution stable strategy strike structure suggestion suppose surprise attack symmetry tacit bargaining tacit game tactic threat threaten tion tive value system yield zero-sum game