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That is, the outcome of this game, starting with finite probabilities of "irrational"
attack on both sides, is not an enlargement of those probabilities by the fear of
surprise attack ; it is either joint attack or no attack. That is, it is a pair of decisions,
22 The probabilities of irrational attack in the first of our modified matrices,
namely the probabilities of 0.2 for each of the ... Each player has fully taken them
into account, has seen that there is still a jointly preferred solution at no-attack,
and by ...
Vr, n-«[= 0.9 — 1.3/V]: value of game to R, joint strategy of no-attack; Vr, «[= 0.5 —
o.5Pc] : value of game to R, who attacks while C elects not to; Vt, n-«[=o.7 — o.iPc
] : value of game to C, joint strategy of no- attack; Vc «[= 0.4] : value of game to ...
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LibraryThing ReviewUser Review - HadriantheBlind - LibraryThing
This is one of the most important books on Game Theory, and also, thankfully, one of the more accessible (certainly much more so than von Neumann's and Morgenstern's book). His main theses are that ... Read full review
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