The Strategy of Conflict'In eminently lucid and often charming language, Professor Schelling's work opens to rational analysis a crucial field of politics, the international politics of threat, or as the current term goes, of deterrence. In this field, the author's analysis goes beyond what has been done by earlier writers. It is the best, most incisive, and most stimulating book on the subject.' |
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Page 212
... attack on both sides , is not an en- largement of those probabilities by the fear of surprise attack ; it is either joint attack or no attack . That is , it is a pair of decisions , not a pair of probabilities about behavior . - - - We ...
... attack on both sides , is not an en- largement of those probabilities by the fear of surprise attack ; it is either joint attack or no attack . That is , it is a pair of decisions , not a pair of probabilities about behavior . - - - We ...
Page 213
... attack equal to 0.7 for C and 0.2 for R , we get Fig . 21. And with probabilities of 0.8 apiece for irrational ... no escaping those two basic probabilities ; but the contemplation of the probabilities has not led to their aggravation . Each ...
... attack equal to 0.7 for C and 0.2 for R , we get Fig . 21. And with probabilities of 0.8 apiece for irrational ... no escaping those two basic probabilities ; but the contemplation of the probabilities has not led to their aggravation . Each ...
Page 216
... no - attack ; Vr , a [ = 0.5 — 0.5P . ] : value of game to R , who attacks while C elects not to ; Vo , n - a [ = 0.7 0.3P . ] : value of game to C , joint strategy of no- attack ; V. , a [ = 0.4 ] : value of game to C , who attacks while R ...
... no - attack ; Vr , a [ = 0.5 — 0.5P . ] : value of game to R , who attacks while C elects not to ; Vo , n - a [ = 0.7 0.3P . ] : value of game to C , joint strategy of no- attack ; V. , a [ = 0.4 ] : value of game to C , who attacks while R ...
Contents
The Retarded Science of International Strategy | 3 |
An Essay on Bargaining | 21 |
Bargaining Communication and Limited War | 53 |
Copyright | |
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Common terms and phrases
action advantage adversary agreement all-out balance of terror bargaining game behavior cell chance Chapter choice choose clue Column commitment communication concert conflict cooperative game coordination coordination game decision depends deterrence enemy enforcement evidence example expected value game theory identify incentive initial interest involved John Harsanyi jointly kind knows likelihood limited limited war Luce and Raiffa mathematical matrix means military minimax missiles mixed strategies move mutual Nash Nash point negotiation no-attack nonzero-sum game nuclear weapons offer one's other's outcome pair participants particular partner party payoff payoff matrix penalty play possible potential preference principle probability problem promise pure Quemoy random rational players recognize retaliation retaliatory forces risk role Row's rules Russians side situation solution stable strategy strike structure suggestion suppose surprise attack symmetry tacit bargaining tacit game tactic threat threaten tion tive value system yield zero-sum game