The Strategy of Conflict'In eminently lucid and often charming language, Professor Schelling's work opens to rational analysis a crucial field of politics, the international politics of threat, or as the current term goes, of deterrence. In this field, the author's analysis goes beyond what has been done by earlier writers. It is the best, most incisive, and most stimulating book on the subject.' |
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Page 87
... particular station , Moriarty gaining more if both get off at some other particular station , both losing unless they get off at the same station . This is the usual nonzero - sum game , or " imperfect - correlation - of - pref- erences ...
... particular station , Moriarty gaining more if both get off at some other particular station , both losing unless they get off at the same station . This is the usual nonzero - sum game , or " imperfect - correlation - of - pref- erences ...
Page 113
... particular simultaneous action among the group , like a mass protest , is often a means of " ratifying " the existence of the coali- tion and of demonstrating that everybody expects everybody else to act in concert . But even in a two ...
... particular simultaneous action among the group , like a mass protest , is often a means of " ratifying " the existence of the coali- tion and of demonstrating that everybody expects everybody else to act in concert . But even in a two ...
Page 261
... particular limit gains in authority from the lack of confidence that either side may have in what alternative limits may be found if the limit is not adhered to . The rationale behind the limit is legalistic and casuistic , not legal ...
... particular limit gains in authority from the lack of confidence that either side may have in what alternative limits may be found if the limit is not adhered to . The rationale behind the limit is legalistic and casuistic , not legal ...
Contents
The Retarded Science of International Strategy | 3 |
An Essay on Bargaining | 21 |
Bargaining Communication and Limited War | 53 |
Copyright | |
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Common terms and phrases
action advantage adversary agreement all-out balance of terror bargaining game behavior cell chance Chapter choice choose clue Column commitment communication concert conflict cooperative game coordination coordination game decision depends deterrence enemy enforcement evidence example expected value game theory identify incentive initial interest involved John Harsanyi jointly kind knows likelihood limited limited war Luce and Raiffa mathematical matrix means military minimax missiles mixed strategies move mutual Nash Nash point negotiation no-attack nonzero-sum game nuclear weapons offer one's other's outcome pair participants particular partner party payoff payoff matrix penalty play possible potential preference principle probability problem promise pure Quemoy random rational players recognize retaliation retaliatory forces risk role Row's rules Russians side situation solution stable strategy strike structure suggestion suppose surprise attack symmetry tacit bargaining tacit game tactic threat threaten tion tive value system yield zero-sum game