The Strategy of Conflict'In eminently lucid and often charming language, Professor Schelling's work opens to rational analysis a crucial field of politics, the international politics of threat, or as the current term goes, of deterrence. In this field, the author's analysis goes beyond what has been done by earlier writers. It is the best, most incisive, and most stimulating book on the subject.' |
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Page 103
... players have placed chips . This process goes on until both players have notified the referee that they are willing to terminate the game . Prizes are now distributed . Each player receives a dollar for every one of his chips still on ...
... players have placed chips . This process goes on until both players have notified the referee that they are willing to terminate the game . Prizes are now distributed . Each player receives a dollar for every one of his chips still on ...
Page 106
... players not only for the pieces they capture but for the pieces they have left over at the end , as well as the squares they occupy , in such fashion that both players have some interest in minimizing the " gross " capture of pieces ...
... players not only for the pieces they capture but for the pieces they have left over at the end , as well as the squares they occupy , in such fashion that both players have some interest in minimizing the " gross " capture of pieces ...
Page 125
... players attempt to make plausible threats , they say , the result becomes indeterminate , depending on the " bargaining per- sonalities " of the players ; " and to predict what will in fact hap- pen without first having a complete ...
... players attempt to make plausible threats , they say , the result becomes indeterminate , depending on the " bargaining per- sonalities " of the players ; " and to predict what will in fact hap- pen without first having a complete ...
Contents
The Retarded Science of International Strategy | 3 |
An Essay on Bargaining | 21 |
Bargaining Communication and Limited War | 53 |
Copyright | |
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Common terms and phrases
action advantage adversary agreement all-out balance of terror bargaining game behavior cell chance Chapter choice choose clue Column commitment communication concert conflict cooperative game coordination coordination game decision depends deterrence enemy enforcement evidence example expected value game theory identify incentive initial interest involved John Harsanyi jointly kind knows likelihood limited limited war Luce and Raiffa mathematical matrix means military minimax missiles mixed strategies move mutual Nash Nash point negotiation no-attack nonzero-sum game nuclear weapons offer one's other's outcome pair participants particular partner party payoff payoff matrix penalty play possible potential preference principle probability problem promise pure Quemoy random rational players recognize retaliation retaliatory forces risk role Row's rules Russians side situation solution stable strategy strike structure suggestion suppose surprise attack symmetry tacit bargaining tacit game tactic threat threaten tion tive value system yield zero-sum game