The Strategy of Conflict'In eminently lucid and often charming language, Professor Schelling's work opens to rational analysis a crucial field of politics, the international politics of threat, or as the current term goes, of deterrence. In this field, the author's analysis goes beyond what has been done by earlier writers. It is the best, most incisive, and most stimulating book on the subject.' |
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Page 182
... probability of apprehension and conviction presumably varies directly with the latter probability ; the simple model analyzed above treats burglars as divisible into two classes — those , let us say , who steal for money and are ...
... probability of apprehension and conviction presumably varies directly with the latter probability ; the simple model analyzed above treats burglars as divisible into two classes — those , let us say , who steal for money and are ...
Page 212
... probabilities of attack by the two sides do not interact to yield a higher probability , except when they yield certainty . That is , the outcome of this game , starting with finite probabilities of " irrational " attack on both sides ...
... probabilities of attack by the two sides do not interact to yield a higher probability , except when they yield certainty . That is , the outcome of this game , starting with finite probabilities of " irrational " attack on both sides ...
Page 217
... probability , I - ( 1 P. ) 2 , that C may attack on either of the next two moves , and makes his own choice in a predictable way . And so on . If each player has n moves , with probability P , or P. of irrational attack at each move ...
... probability , I - ( 1 P. ) 2 , that C may attack on either of the next two moves , and makes his own choice in a predictable way . And so on . If each player has n moves , with probability P , or P. of irrational attack at each move ...
Contents
The Retarded Science of International Strategy | 3 |
An Essay on Bargaining | 21 |
Bargaining Communication and Limited War | 53 |
Copyright | |
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Common terms and phrases
action advantage adversary agreement all-out balance of terror bargaining game behavior cell chance Chapter choice choose clue Column commitment communication concert conflict cooperative game coordination coordination game decision depends deterrence enemy enforcement evidence example expected value game theory identify incentive initial interest involved John Harsanyi jointly kind knows likelihood limited limited war Luce and Raiffa mathematical matrix means military minimax missiles mixed strategies move mutual Nash Nash point negotiation no-attack nonzero-sum game nuclear weapons offer one's other's outcome pair participants particular partner party payoff payoff matrix penalty play possible potential preference principle probability problem promise pure Quemoy random rational players recognize retaliation retaliatory forces risk role Row's rules Russians side situation solution stable strategy strike structure suggestion suppose surprise attack symmetry tacit bargaining tacit game tactic threat threaten tion tive value system yield zero-sum game