## The Strategy of ConflictNo background in mathematics needed, but some knowledge of game theory useful. |

### From inside the book

Results 1-3 of 25

Page 4

We thus limit the applicability of any results we

of actual behavior , the results we

either a good approximation of reality or a caricature . Any abstraction runs a risk

of ...

We thus limit the applicability of any results we

**reach**. If our interest is the studyof actual behavior , the results we

**reach**under this constraint may prove to beeither a good approximation of reality or a caricature . Any abstraction runs a risk

of ...

Page 62

If they can

tax bill in whatever manner they agree on . But they must

without communication ; each is to write down the share he proposes to pay , and

if the ...

If they can

**reach**agreement on shares of this total , they may share the annualtax bill in whatever manner they agree on . But they must

**reach**agreementwithout communication ; each is to write down the share he proposes to pay , and

if the ...

Page 271

The most informative way to characterize the game , then , is not that the players

must

altogether . It is that they must

The most informative way to characterize the game , then , is not that the players

must

**reach**overt agreement by the time the final bell rings or forego the rewardsaltogether . It is that they must

**reach**overt agreement by a particular ( and well ...### What people are saying - Write a review

#### LibraryThing Review

User Review - HadriantheBlind - LibraryThingThis is one of the most important books on Game Theory, and also, thankfully, one of the more accessible (certainly much more so than von Neumann's and Morgenstern's book). His main theses are that ... Read full review

### Contents

Bargaining Communication and Limited | 3 |

Toward a Theory of Interdependent Decision | 83 |

Enforcement Communication and Strategic | 119 |

Copyright | |

9 other sections not shown

### Other editions - View all

### Common terms and phrases

action advantage agree agreement alternative assume attack bargaining become behavior better carry chance Chapter choice choose Column commitment communication concert consider cooperative coordination cost course decision depends deterrence effect enemy enforcement evidence example expectations fact final forces gain game theory give given identify important incentive initial interest involved keep kind knows least leave less limited mathematical matrix matter means meet move mutual negotiation nuclear objective offer one's original other's outcome pair particular party payoff perhaps person play players position possible potential preference present principle probability problem promise pure question random rational reach reason recognize reduce relation requires retaliation risk role rules Russians seems sense side situation solution strategy strike structure suggestion suppose surprise symmetry tacit tactic third threat threaten tion weapons yield