The Strategy of Conflict'In eminently lucid and often charming language, Professor Schelling's work opens to rational analysis a crucial field of politics, the international politics of threat, or as the current term goes, of deterrence. In this field, the author's analysis goes beyond what has been done by earlier writers. It is the best, most incisive, and most stimulating book on the subject.' |
From inside the book
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Page 182
... reduce a threat by reducing the probability of its fulfillment reduces the expected value of the outcome proportionately for both players , while a direct reduction in size might not be restricted to proportionate 182 STRATEGY WITH A ...
... reduce a threat by reducing the probability of its fulfillment reduces the expected value of the outcome proportionately for both players , while a direct reduction in size might not be restricted to proportionate 182 STRATEGY WITH A ...
Page 230
... reduce the likelihood of war or to reduce its scope and violence . Most proposals have taken as a premise that a reduction in the quantity and potency of weapons , particularly of " offen- sive " weapons and of weapons that either ...
... reduce the likelihood of war or to reduce its scope and violence . Most proposals have taken as a premise that a reduction in the quantity and potency of weapons , particularly of " offen- sive " weapons and of weapons that either ...
Page 244
... reduce the likeli- hood that his attack will succeed — if they raise the likelihood that we can retaliate severely we may want to make a quick demonstration to the enemy that we are ready , in the hope that our improved posture will ...
... reduce the likeli- hood that his attack will succeed — if they raise the likelihood that we can retaliate severely we may want to make a quick demonstration to the enemy that we are ready , in the hope that our improved posture will ...
Contents
The Retarded Science of International Strategy | 3 |
An Essay on Bargaining | 21 |
Bargaining Communication and Limited War | 53 |
Copyright | |
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Common terms and phrases
action advantage adversary agreement all-out balance of terror bargaining game behavior cell chance Chapter choice choose clue Column commitment communication concert conflict cooperative game coordination coordination game decision depends deterrence enemy enforcement evidence example expected value game theory identify incentive initial interest involved John Harsanyi jointly kind knows likelihood limited limited war Luce and Raiffa mathematical matrix means military minimax missiles mixed strategies move mutual Nash Nash point negotiation no-attack nonzero-sum game nuclear weapons offer one's other's outcome pair participants particular partner party payoff payoff matrix penalty play possible potential preference principle probability problem promise pure Quemoy random rational players recognize retaliation retaliatory forces risk role Row's rules Russians side situation solution stable strategy strike structure suggestion suppose surprise attack symmetry tacit bargaining tacit game tactic threat threaten tion tive value system yield zero-sum game