The Strategy of Conflict'In eminently lucid and often charming language, Professor Schelling's work opens to rational analysis a crucial field of politics, the international politics of threat, or as the current term goes, of deterrence. In this field, the author's analysis goes beyond what has been done by earlier writers. It is the best, most incisive, and most stimulating book on the subject.' |
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Page 3
... sense . - - We can call this field of study the strategy of conflict.1 We can be interested in it for at least three reasons . We may be involved in a conflict ourselves ; we all are , in fact , participants in interna- tional conflict ...
... sense . - - We can call this field of study the strategy of conflict.1 We can be interested in it for at least three reasons . We may be involved in a conflict ourselves ; we all are , in fact , participants in interna- tional conflict ...
Page 129
... sense , he can do so in a " legal " sense by threatening to choose I unless Row promises to chose ii . Full analysis in this case requires attention to the penalties on promises as well as on threats . Since the physical and institu ...
... sense , he can do so in a " legal " sense by threatening to choose I unless Row promises to chose ii . Full analysis in this case requires attention to the penalties on promises as well as on threats . Since the physical and institu ...
Page 291
... sense for the " noncooperative " game . By " reasoning that lies behind these concepts " I mean the reasoning that is imputed to the rational players to whom the concepts should appeal.1 1 I II 1 0 0 O 3 0 3 FIG . 25 The tacit games ...
... sense for the " noncooperative " game . By " reasoning that lies behind these concepts " I mean the reasoning that is imputed to the rational players to whom the concepts should appeal.1 1 I II 1 0 0 O 3 0 3 FIG . 25 The tacit games ...
Contents
The Retarded Science of International Strategy | 3 |
An Essay on Bargaining | 21 |
Bargaining Communication and Limited War | 53 |
Copyright | |
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Common terms and phrases
action advantage adversary agreement all-out balance of terror bargaining game behavior cell chance Chapter choice choose clue Column commitment communication concert conflict cooperative game coordination coordination game decision depends deterrence enemy enforcement evidence example expected value game theory identify incentive initial interest involved John Harsanyi jointly kind knows likelihood limited limited war Luce and Raiffa mathematical matrix means military minimax missiles mixed strategies move mutual Nash Nash point negotiation no-attack nonzero-sum game nuclear weapons offer one's other's outcome pair participants particular partner party payoff payoff matrix penalty play possible potential preference principle probability problem promise pure Quemoy random rational players recognize retaliation retaliatory forces risk role Row's rules Russians side situation solution stable strategy strike structure suggestion suppose surprise attack symmetry tacit bargaining tacit game tactic threat threaten tion tive value system yield zero-sum game