The Strategy of Conflict'In eminently lucid and often charming language, Professor Schelling's work opens to rational analysis a crucial field of politics, the international politics of threat, or as the current term goes, of deterrence. In this field, the author's analysis goes beyond what has been done by earlier writers. It is the best, most incisive, and most stimulating book on the subject.' |
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Page 22
... situation we may find it in the tactics employed . The purpose of this chapter is to call attention to an important class of tactics , of a kind that is peculiarly appropriate to the logic of indeterminate situations . The essence of ...
... situation we may find it in the tactics employed . The purpose of this chapter is to call attention to an important class of tactics , of a kind that is peculiarly appropriate to the logic of indeterminate situations . The essence of ...
Page 86
... situations in which the conflict of interest in the choice of action may be over- whelmed by the sheer need for ... situation in which each player's best choice of action depends on the action he expects the other to take , which he ...
... situations in which the conflict of interest in the choice of action may be over- whelmed by the sheer need for ... situation in which each player's best choice of action depends on the action he expects the other to take , which he ...
Page 93
... situation , except insofar as the objective situation may provide some clue for a concerted choice . The analogy is not just trying to vote with the majority but trying to vote with a majority when everyone wants to be in a So is ...
... situation , except insofar as the objective situation may provide some clue for a concerted choice . The analogy is not just trying to vote with the majority but trying to vote with a majority when everyone wants to be in a So is ...
Contents
The Retarded Science of International Strategy | 3 |
An Essay on Bargaining | 21 |
Bargaining Communication and Limited War | 53 |
Copyright | |
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Common terms and phrases
action advantage adversary agreement all-out balance of terror bargaining game behavior cell chance Chapter choice choose clue Column commitment communication concert conflict cooperative game coordination coordination game decision depends deterrence enemy enforcement evidence example expected value game theory identify incentive initial interest involved John Harsanyi jointly kind knows likelihood limited limited war Luce and Raiffa mathematical matrix means military minimax missiles mixed strategies move mutual Nash Nash point negotiation no-attack nonzero-sum game nuclear weapons offer one's other's outcome pair participants particular partner party payoff payoff matrix penalty play possible potential preference principle probability problem promise pure Quemoy random rational players recognize retaliation retaliatory forces risk role Row's rules Russians side situation solution stable strategy strike structure suggestion suppose surprise attack symmetry tacit bargaining tacit game tactic threat threaten tion tive value system yield zero-sum game