The Strategy of Conflict'In eminently lucid and often charming language, Professor Schelling's work opens to rational analysis a crucial field of politics, the international politics of threat, or as the current term goes, of deterrence. In this field, the author's analysis goes beyond what has been done by earlier writers. It is the best, most incisive, and most stimulating book on the subject.' |
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Page 223
... stability of the modified matrix be met . It remains to be specified how the players behave . Broadly speaking , we can ... stable or explosive depending on the parameter values and shape of the ƒ function . We can express each player's ...
... stability of the modified matrix be met . It remains to be specified how the players behave . Broadly speaking , we can ... stable or explosive depending on the parameter values and shape of the ƒ function . We can express each player's ...
Page 225
... stable matrix , since it does enter into the condition that P , must meet . So in projecting C's adjustment , R would have to take A , into account . But " projecting " C's behavior , rather than just observing B , and R , continuously ...
... stable matrix , since it does enter into the condition that P , must meet . So in projecting C's adjustment , R would have to take A , into account . But " projecting " C's behavior , rather than just observing B , and R , continuously ...
Page 237
... stable deterrence , and of schemes for the prevention of surprise attack , the question of more vs. fewer weapons has to be analyzed on its merits in individual cases . It is not a foregone conclusion that disarmament , in the literal ...
... stable deterrence , and of schemes for the prevention of surprise attack , the question of more vs. fewer weapons has to be analyzed on its merits in individual cases . It is not a foregone conclusion that disarmament , in the literal ...
Contents
The Retarded Science of International Strategy | 3 |
An Essay on Bargaining | 21 |
Bargaining Communication and Limited War | 53 |
Copyright | |
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Common terms and phrases
action advantage adversary agreement all-out balance of terror bargaining game behavior cell chance Chapter choice choose clue Column commitment communication concert conflict cooperative game coordination coordination game decision depends deterrence enemy enforcement evidence example expected value game theory identify incentive initial interest involved John Harsanyi jointly kind knows likelihood limited limited war Luce and Raiffa mathematical matrix means military minimax missiles mixed strategies move mutual Nash Nash point negotiation no-attack nonzero-sum game nuclear weapons offer one's other's outcome pair participants particular partner party payoff payoff matrix penalty play possible potential preference principle probability problem promise pure Quemoy random rational players recognize retaliation retaliatory forces risk role Row's rules Russians side situation solution stable strategy strike structure suggestion suppose surprise attack symmetry tacit bargaining tacit game tactic threat threaten tion tive value system yield zero-sum game