The Strategy of Conflict'In eminently lucid and often charming language, Professor Schelling's work opens to rational analysis a crucial field of politics, the international politics of threat, or as the current term goes, of deterrence. In this field, the author's analysis goes beyond what has been done by earlier writers. It is the best, most incisive, and most stimulating book on the subject.' |
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Page 233
... strike back there would be no powerful temptation to strike first . And there would be less need to react quickly to what might prove to be a false alarm . Thus schemes to avert surprise attack have as their most im- mediate objective ...
... strike back there would be no powerful temptation to strike first . And there would be less need to react quickly to what might prove to be a false alarm . Thus schemes to avert surprise attack have as their most im- mediate objective ...
Page 240
... strike second and gain no advantage in striking first . At the opposite extreme is a weapon that is itself so vulnerable that it could not survive to strike second , or a weapon so specialized for finding and destroy- ing the enemy's ...
... strike second and gain no advantage in striking first . At the opposite extreme is a weapon that is itself so vulnerable that it could not survive to strike second , or a weapon so specialized for finding and destroy- ing the enemy's ...
Page 308
... Strike , 5 , 6 , 27 , 35 , 67. See also Union Strike funds , 29 Surprise attack , 7 , 12 , 15 , 89n , 133 , 137 , 148 , 170 , 207ff , 230ff . See also Arms control ; Warning Sutherland , E. H. , 141 Symmetry , 114 , 117 , 122 , 131 ...
... Strike , 5 , 6 , 27 , 35 , 67. See also Union Strike funds , 29 Surprise attack , 7 , 12 , 15 , 89n , 133 , 137 , 148 , 170 , 207ff , 230ff . See also Arms control ; Warning Sutherland , E. H. , 141 Symmetry , 114 , 117 , 122 , 131 ...
Contents
The Retarded Science of International Strategy | 3 |
An Essay on Bargaining | 21 |
Bargaining Communication and Limited War | 53 |
Copyright | |
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Common terms and phrases
action advantage adversary agreement all-out balance of terror bargaining game behavior cell chance Chapter choice choose clue Column commitment communication concert conflict cooperative game coordination coordination game decision depends deterrence enemy enforcement evidence example expected value game theory identify incentive initial interest involved John Harsanyi jointly kind knows likelihood limited limited war Luce and Raiffa mathematical matrix means military minimax missiles mixed strategies move mutual Nash Nash point negotiation no-attack nonzero-sum game nuclear weapons offer one's other's outcome pair participants particular partner party payoff payoff matrix penalty play possible potential preference principle probability problem promise pure Quemoy random rational players recognize retaliation retaliatory forces risk role Row's rules Russians side situation solution stable strategy strike structure suggestion suppose surprise attack symmetry tacit bargaining tacit game tactic threat threaten tion tive value system yield zero-sum game