## The Strategy of ConflictNo background in mathematics needed, but some knowledge of game theory useful. |

### From inside the book

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Page 123

... both motivated by the possibility that a rational second player can be

constrained by his knowledge that the first player has altered his own incentive

only insofar ...

... both motivated by the possibility that a rational second player can be

constrained by his knowledge that the first player has altered his own incentive

**structure**. Like an ordinary commitment , a threat can constrain the other playeronly insofar ...

Page 124

ture and communication

mutually beneficial move , precluding a jointly undesired outcome by improving

the second party ' s understanding . The main point of analytical similarity ...

ture and communication

**structure**worth keeping distinct . In this latter case it is amutually beneficial move , precluding a jointly undesired outcome by improving

the second party ' s understanding . The main point of analytical similarity ...

Page 268

A game of this sort is symmetrical in its move

asymmetrical in the configuration of payoffs . The two players have identical

privileges of communication , of refusing offers , and of reaching agreement . If

instead ...

A game of this sort is symmetrical in its move

**structure**, even though it may beasymmetrical in the configuration of payoffs . The two players have identical

privileges of communication , of refusing offers , and of reaching agreement . If

instead ...

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#### LibraryThing Review

User Review - HadriantheBlind - LibraryThingThis is one of the most important books on Game Theory, and also, thankfully, one of the more accessible (certainly much more so than von Neumann's and Morgenstern's book). His main theses are that ... Read full review

### Contents

Bargaining Communication and Limited | 3 |

Toward a Theory of Interdependent Decision | 83 |

Enforcement Communication and Strategic | 119 |

Copyright | |

9 other sections not shown

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### Common terms and phrases

action advantage agree agreement alternative assume attack bargaining become behavior better carry chance Chapter choice choose Column commitment communication concert consider cooperative coordination cost course decision depends deterrence effect enemy enforcement evidence example expectations fact final forces gain game theory give given identify important incentive initial interest involved keep kind knows least leave less limited mathematical matrix matter means meet move mutual negotiation nuclear objective offer one's original other's outcome pair particular party payoff perhaps person play players position possible potential preference present principle probability problem promise pure question random rational reach reason recognize reduce relation requires retaliation risk role rules Russians seems sense side situation solution strategy strike structure suggestion suppose surprise symmetry tacit tactic third threat threaten tion weapons yield