The Strategy of Conflict'In eminently lucid and often charming language, Professor Schelling's work opens to rational analysis a crucial field of politics, the international politics of threat, or as the current term goes, of deterrence. In this field, the author's analysis goes beyond what has been done by earlier writers. It is the best, most incisive, and most stimulating book on the subject.' |
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Page 66
... suppose that the master - of - ceremonies in that problem considered the first offer already to have spoiled the game and thought he might confuse the players by announcing the reversal of their prize schedules . A will get whatever ...
... suppose that the master - of - ceremonies in that problem considered the first offer already to have spoiled the game and thought he might confuse the players by announcing the reversal of their prize schedules . A will get whatever ...
Page 184
... suppose as is roughly true in the hitchhiker case that the risk of inadvertent fulfillment is proportionate to the probability , π , that one will fulfill the threat if the adversary does not comply - if the watchdog's pro- pensity to ...
... suppose as is roughly true in the hitchhiker case that the risk of inadvertent fulfillment is proportionate to the probability , π , that one will fulfill the threat if the adversary does not comply - if the watchdog's pro- pensity to ...
Page 215
... Suppose the value of " winning " a war , denoted by h , may exceed 1 ; if it does , and if it is always a winning strategy to attack when the other does not , both players have dominant strategies at " attack . " They both gain zero ...
... Suppose the value of " winning " a war , denoted by h , may exceed 1 ; if it does , and if it is always a winning strategy to attack when the other does not , both players have dominant strategies at " attack . " They both gain zero ...
Contents
The Retarded Science of International Strategy | 3 |
An Essay on Bargaining | 21 |
Bargaining Communication and Limited War | 53 |
Copyright | |
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Common terms and phrases
action advantage adversary agreement all-out balance of terror bargaining game behavior cell chance Chapter choice choose clue Column commitment communication concert conflict cooperative game coordination coordination game decision depends deterrence enemy enforcement evidence example expected value game theory identify incentive initial interest involved John Harsanyi jointly kind knows likelihood limited limited war Luce and Raiffa mathematical matrix means military minimax missiles mixed strategies move mutual Nash Nash point negotiation no-attack nonzero-sum game nuclear weapons offer one's other's outcome pair participants particular partner party payoff payoff matrix penalty play possible potential preference principle probability problem promise pure Quemoy random rational players recognize retaliation retaliatory forces risk role Row's rules Russians side situation solution stable strategy strike structure suggestion suppose surprise attack symmetry tacit bargaining tacit game tactic threat threaten tion tive value system yield zero-sum game