The Strategy of Conflict'In eminently lucid and often charming language, Professor Schelling's work opens to rational analysis a crucial field of politics, the international politics of threat, or as the current term goes, of deterrence. In this field, the author's analysis goes beyond what has been done by earlier writers. It is the best, most incisive, and most stimulating book on the subject.' |
From inside the book
Results 1-3 of 49
Page 221
... attack . One's response to an in- crease in the probability of being attacked is to shift the criteria for decision that are used in the warning system in the direction of lesser likelihood of a failure to respond ... SURPRISE ATTACK 221.
... attack . One's response to an in- crease in the probability of being attacked is to shift the criteria for decision that are used in the warning system in the direction of lesser likelihood of a failure to respond ... SURPRISE ATTACK 221.
Page 230
Thomas C. Schelling. 10 SURPRISE ATTACK AND DISARMAMENT " Disarmament " has covered a variety of schemes , some in- genious and some sentimental , for cooperation among potential enemies to reduce the ... Surprise Attack and Disarmament.
Thomas C. Schelling. 10 SURPRISE ATTACK AND DISARMAMENT " Disarmament " has covered a variety of schemes , some in- genious and some sentimental , for cooperation among potential enemies to reduce the ... Surprise Attack and Disarmament.
Page 233
... surprise attack thus lies in the pos- sible vulnerability of retaliatory forces . If these forces were them- selves invulnerable — if each side were confident that its own forces could survive an attack , but also that it could not ...
... surprise attack thus lies in the pos- sible vulnerability of retaliatory forces . If these forces were them- selves invulnerable — if each side were confident that its own forces could survive an attack , but also that it could not ...
Contents
The Retarded Science of International Strategy | 3 |
An Essay on Bargaining | 21 |
Bargaining Communication and Limited War | 53 |
Copyright | |
11 other sections not shown
Other editions - View all
Common terms and phrases
action advantage adversary agreement all-out balance of terror bargaining game behavior cell chance Chapter choice choose clue Column commitment communication concert conflict cooperative game coordination coordination game decision depends deterrence enemy enforcement evidence example expected value game theory identify incentive initial interest involved John Harsanyi jointly kind knows likelihood limited limited war Luce and Raiffa mathematical matrix means military minimax missiles mixed strategies move mutual Nash Nash point negotiation no-attack nonzero-sum game nuclear weapons offer one's other's outcome pair participants particular partner party payoff payoff matrix penalty play possible potential preference principle probability problem promise pure Quemoy random rational players recognize retaliation retaliatory forces risk role Row's rules Russians side situation solution stable strategy strike structure suggestion suppose surprise attack symmetry tacit bargaining tacit game tactic threat threaten tion tive value system yield zero-sum game