The Strategy of Conflict'In eminently lucid and often charming language, Professor Schelling's work opens to rational analysis a crucial field of politics, the international politics of threat, or as the current term goes, of deterrence. In this field, the author's analysis goes beyond what has been done by earlier writers. It is the best, most incisive, and most stimulating book on the subject.' |
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Page 91
... tion could be contradicted only by explicit agreement ; if coordina- tion has to be tacit , compromise may be impossible . People are at the mercy of a faulty communication system that makes it easy to " agree " ( tacitly ) to move but ...
... tion could be contradicted only by explicit agreement ; if coordina- tion has to be tacit , compromise may be impossible . People are at the mercy of a faulty communication system that makes it easy to " agree " ( tacitly ) to move but ...
Page 141
... tion and exchange , namely , the enormous potential for destruc- tion that is available and that is relevant because of the extor- tionate threats that could be supported by it . The ordinary healthy high - school graduate , of slightly ...
... tion and exchange , namely , the enormous potential for destruc- tion that is available and that is relevant because of the extor- tionate threats that could be supported by it . The ordinary healthy high - school graduate , of slightly ...
Page 240
... tion for an arms race . It does indeed suggest that " disarmament ” in the literal sense , aimed indiscriminately at weapons of all kinds or even selectively aimed at the most horrifying weapons of mass destruction - could produce ...
... tion for an arms race . It does indeed suggest that " disarmament ” in the literal sense , aimed indiscriminately at weapons of all kinds or even selectively aimed at the most horrifying weapons of mass destruction - could produce ...
Contents
The Retarded Science of International Strategy | 3 |
An Essay on Bargaining | 21 |
Bargaining Communication and Limited War | 53 |
Copyright | |
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Common terms and phrases
action advantage adversary agreement all-out balance of terror bargaining game behavior cell chance Chapter choice choose clue Column commitment communication concert conflict cooperative game coordination coordination game decision depends deterrence enemy enforcement evidence example expected value game theory identify incentive initial interest involved John Harsanyi jointly kind knows likelihood limited limited war Luce and Raiffa mathematical matrix means military minimax missiles mixed strategies move mutual Nash Nash point negotiation no-attack nonzero-sum game nuclear weapons offer one's other's outcome pair participants particular partner party payoff payoff matrix penalty play possible potential preference principle probability problem promise pure Quemoy random rational players recognize retaliation retaliatory forces risk role Row's rules Russians side situation solution stable strategy strike structure suggestion suppose surprise attack symmetry tacit bargaining tacit game tactic threat threaten tion tive value system yield zero-sum game