## The Strategy of ConflictNo background in mathematics needed, but some knowledge of game theory useful. |

### From inside the book

Results 1-3 of 40

Page 46

A deterrent to initiative is the information it

one ' s eagerness . But if each has visible reason to expect the other to meet him

half way , because of a history of successful bargaining , that very history

provides ...

A deterrent to initiative is the information it

**yields**, or may seem to**yield**, aboutone ' s eagerness . But if each has visible reason to expect the other to meet him

half way , because of a history of successful bargaining , that very history

provides ...

Page 212

But we do not . We do not get any regular kind of “ multiplier " effect out of this .

The probabilities of attack by the two sides do not interact to

probability , except when they

starting ...

But we do not . We do not get any regular kind of “ multiplier " effect out of this .

The probabilities of attack by the two sides do not interact to

**yield**a higherprobability , except when they

**yield**certainty . That is , the outcome of this game ,starting ...

Page 292

A jointly admissible strategy pair is a pair that is not jointly dominated by another

pair ; that is , it

equivalent if , for each player separately , they

pairs are ...

A jointly admissible strategy pair is a pair that is not jointly dominated by another

pair ; that is , it

**yields**a pair of payoffs that are not ... Equilibrium pairs areequivalent if , for each player separately , they

**yield**equal payoffs ; equilibriumpairs are ...

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#### LibraryThing Review

User Review - HadriantheBlind - LibraryThingThis is one of the most important books on Game Theory, and also, thankfully, one of the more accessible (certainly much more so than von Neumann's and Morgenstern's book). His main theses are that ... Read full review

### Contents

Bargaining Communication and Limited | 3 |

Toward a Theory of Interdependent Decision | 83 |

Enforcement Communication and Strategic | 119 |

Copyright | |

9 other sections not shown

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### Common terms and phrases

action advantage agree agreement alternative assume attack bargaining become behavior better carry chance Chapter choice choose Column commitment communication concert consider cooperative coordination cost course decision depends deterrence effect enemy enforcement evidence example expectations fact final forces gain game theory give given identify important incentive initial interest involved keep kind knows least leave less limited mathematical matrix matter means meet move mutual negotiation nuclear objective offer one's original other's outcome pair particular party payoff perhaps person play players position possible potential preference present principle probability problem promise pure question random rational reach reason recognize reduce relation requires retaliation risk role rules Russians seems sense side situation solution strategy strike structure suggestion suppose surprise symmetry tacit tactic third threat threaten tion weapons yield