## The strategy of conflict |

### From inside the book

Results 1-3 of 17

Page 84

That game theory is underdeveloped along these two lines may reflect its

preoccupation with the

promises, are of no consequence in the accepted theory of zero-sum games.

They are ...

That game theory is underdeveloped along these two lines may reflect its

preoccupation with the

**zero**-**sum game**. Suggestions and inferences, threats andpromises, are of no consequence in the accepted theory of zero-sum games.

They are ...

Page 85

If chess is the standard example of a

game of pure coordination ; if pursuit epitomizes the

may do the same for the coordination game. An experiment of O. K. Moore and ...

If chess is the standard example of a

**zero**-**sum game**, charades may typify thegame of pure coordination ; if pursuit epitomizes the

**zero**-**sum game**, rendezvousmay do the same for the coordination game. An experiment of O. K. Moore and ...

Page 175

It may be no exaggeration to say that the potentialities of randomized behavior

account for most of the interest in game theory during the past one and one- half

decades.1 The essence of randomization in a two-person

It may be no exaggeration to say that the potentialities of randomized behavior

account for most of the interest in game theory during the past one and one- half

decades.1 The essence of randomization in a two-person

**zero**-**sum game**is to ...### What people are saying - Write a review

#### LibraryThing Review

User Review - HadriantheBlind - LibraryThingThis is one of the most important books on Game Theory, and also, thankfully, one of the more accessible (certainly much more so than von Neumann's and Morgenstern's book). His main theses are that ... Read full review

### Contents

The Retarded Science of International Strategy | 3 |

An Essay on Bargaining | 21 |

Bargaining Communication and Limited War | 53 |

Copyright | |

10 other sections not shown

### Other editions - View all

### Common terms and phrases

action advantage adversary agreement all-out balance of terror bargaining game behavior Bernard Brodie bilateral monopoly cell chance Chapter choice choose clue Column commitment communication concert conflict cooperative game coordination coordination game decision depends deterrence enemy enforcement evidence example expected value game theory identify incentive initial interest involved John Harsanyi jointly kind knows likelihood limited Luce and Raiffa mathematical matrix means military minimax missiles mixed strategies motive move mutual Nash Nash point negotiation no-attack nonzero-sum game nuclear weapons offer one's other's outcome pair participants particular partner party payoff payoff matrix penalty play possible potential preference principle probability problem promise pure Quemoy random rational players recognize retaliation retaliatory forces risk role Row's rules Russians side situation solution stable strategy strike suggestion suppose surprise attack symmetry tacit bargaining tacit game tactic threat threaten tion tive value system yield zero-sum game