## The strategy of conflict |

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Page 272

8 It should be emphasized that bargaining-game solutions that (like the

Harsanyi solutions) depend on a clearly recognized zero

unambiguous outcome that reigns in the absence of overt agreement — cannot ...

8 It should be emphasized that bargaining-game solutions that (like the

**Nash**andHarsanyi solutions) depend on a clearly recognized zero

**point**— that is, on anunambiguous outcome that reigns in the absence of overt agreement — cannot ...

Page 287

... particular symmetry of the Nash solution — put ourselves in a frame of mind

congenial to accepting the "

Nash for bargaining games in which both players have perfect knowledge of their

own ...

... particular symmetry of the Nash solution — put ourselves in a frame of mind

congenial to accepting the "

**Nash point**" as ... "The solution proposed by J. F.Nash for bargaining games in which both players have perfect knowledge of their

own ...

Page 289

boundary is a straight line or circular arc (which again coincides with the

particular point ; or unless there is an impurity (such as a dot on the boundary,

from a ...

boundary is a straight line or circular arc (which again coincides with the

**Nash****point**) ; or some especially suggestive form that seems to point towards aparticular point ; or unless there is an impurity (such as a dot on the boundary,

from a ...

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#### LibraryThing Review

User Review - HadriantheBlind - LibraryThingThis is one of the most important books on Game Theory, and also, thankfully, one of the more accessible (certainly much more so than von Neumann's and Morgenstern's book). His main theses are that ... Read full review

### Contents

The Retarded Science of International Strategy | 3 |

An Essay on Bargaining | 21 |

? Bargaining Communication and Limited War | 53 |

Copyright | |

11 other sections not shown

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### Common terms and phrases

action advantage adversary agreement all-out balance of terror bargaining game behavior Bernard Brodie bilateral monopoly chance Chapter choice choose clue Column commitment communication concert conflict cooperative game coordination coordination game decision depends deterrence enemy enforcement evidence example expected value explicit game theory identify incentive initial interest involved John Harsanyi jointly kind knows likelihood limited Luce and Raiffa mathematical matrix means military minimax missiles mixed strategies motive move mutual Nash Nash point negotiation no-attack nonzero-sum game nuclear weapons offer one's other's outcome pair participants particular partner party payoff payoff matrix penalty play possible potential preference principle probability problem promise pure Quemoy random rational players recognize retaliation retaliatory forces risk role Row's rules Russians side situation solution stable strategy strike suggestion suppose surprise attack symmetry tacit bargaining tacit game tactic threat threaten tion tive value system yield zero-sum game