## The strategy of conflict |

### From inside the book

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Page 34

Having pledged it, he may persuade his

stalemate rather than capitulate and discredit the ... it may mark a prior

commitment as a fraud, and make the

commitment. One ...

Having pledged it, he may persuade his

**adversary**that he would acceptstalemate rather than capitulate and discredit the ... it may mark a prior

commitment as a fraud, and make the

**adversary**skeptical of any new pretense atcommitment. One ...

Page 175

... randomized behavior account for most of the interest in game theory during the

past one and one- half decades.1 The essence of randomization in a two-person

zero- sum game is to preclude the

... randomized behavior account for most of the interest in game theory during the

past one and one- half decades.1 The essence of randomization in a two-person

zero- sum game is to preclude the

**adversary's**gaining intelligence about one's ...Page 200

brinkmanship, frighten the

the edge that if one decides to jump one can do so before anyone can stop him.

Brinkmanship involves getting onto the slope where one may fall in spite of his ...

brinkmanship, frighten the

**adversary**who is roped to him by getting so close tothe edge that if one decides to jump one can do so before anyone can stop him.

Brinkmanship involves getting onto the slope where one may fall in spite of his ...

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#### LibraryThing Review

User Review - HadriantheBlind - LibraryThingThis is one of the most important books on Game Theory, and also, thankfully, one of the more accessible (certainly much more so than von Neumann's and Morgenstern's book). His main theses are that ... Read full review

### Contents

The Retarded Science of International Strategy | 3 |

An Essay on Bargaining | 21 |

? Bargaining Communication and Limited War | 53 |

Copyright | |

11 other sections not shown

### Other editions - View all

### Common terms and phrases

action advantage adversary agreement all-out balance of terror bargaining game behavior Bernard Brodie bilateral monopoly chance Chapter choice choose clue Column commitment communication concert conflict cooperative game coordination coordination game decision depends deterrence enemy enforcement evidence example expected value explicit game theory identify incentive initial interest involved John Harsanyi jointly kind knows likelihood limited Luce and Raiffa mathematical matrix means military minimax missiles mixed strategies motive move mutual Nash Nash point negotiation no-attack nonzero-sum game nuclear weapons offer one's other's outcome pair participants particular partner party payoff payoff matrix penalty play possible potential preference principle probability problem promise pure Quemoy random rational players recognize retaliation retaliatory forces risk role Row's rules Russians side situation solution stable strategy strike suggestion suppose surprise attack symmetry tacit bargaining tacit game tactic threat threaten tion tive value system yield zero-sum game