## The strategy of conflict |

### From inside the book

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Page 75

If the analysis provides anything, then, it is not a judgment of the probability of

successfully reaching tacit

for the terms of

are ...

If the analysis provides anything, then, it is not a judgment of the probability of

successfully reaching tacit

**agreement**but a better understanding of where to lookfor the terms of

**agreement**. If there are important conclusions to be drawn, theyare ...

Page 269

If

the way they have

Next, what do we mean by "

...

If

**agreement**exists when the midnight bell rings, the players divide the gains inthe way they have

**agreed**; if no**agreement**exists, the players receive nothing.Next, what do we mean by "

**agreement**"? For simplicity, suppose that each player...

Page 272

Instead of saying that the players may divide a set of rewards if they can reach

of rewards to the extent that they have reached

may ...

Instead of saying that the players may divide a set of rewards if they can reach

**agreement**on an exhaustive division, let us say that the players may divide a setof rewards to the extent that they have reached

**agreement**on a division ; theymay ...

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#### LibraryThing Review

User Review - HadriantheBlind - LibraryThingThis is one of the most important books on Game Theory, and also, thankfully, one of the more accessible (certainly much more so than von Neumann's and Morgenstern's book). His main theses are that ... Read full review

### Contents

The Retarded Science of International Strategy | 3 |

An Essay on Bargaining | 21 |

? Bargaining Communication and Limited War | 53 |

Copyright | |

11 other sections not shown

### Other editions - View all

### Common terms and phrases

action advantage adversary agreement all-out balance of terror bargaining game behavior Bernard Brodie bilateral monopoly chance Chapter choice choose clue Column commitment communication concert conflict cooperative game coordination coordination game decision depends deterrence enemy enforcement evidence example expected value explicit game theory identify incentive initial interest involved John Harsanyi jointly kind knows likelihood limited Luce and Raiffa mathematical matrix means military minimax missiles mixed strategies motive move mutual Nash Nash point negotiation no-attack nonzero-sum game nuclear weapons offer one's other's outcome pair participants particular partner party payoff payoff matrix penalty play possible potential preference principle probability problem promise pure Quemoy random rational players recognize retaliation retaliatory forces risk role Row's rules Russians side situation solution stable strategy strike suggestion suppose surprise attack symmetry tacit bargaining tacit game tactic threat threaten tion tive value system yield zero-sum game