The Strategy of ConflictNo background in mathematics needed, but some knowledge of game theory useful. |
From inside the book
Results 1-3 of 7
Page 234
... balance of terror with anything better , there may be much that we can do to make that balance stable rather than unstable.3 - Once we have identified the surprise - attack problem as the possible vulnerability of either side's ...
... balance of terror with anything better , there may be much that we can do to make that balance stable rather than unstable.3 - Once we have identified the surprise - attack problem as the possible vulnerability of either side's ...
Page 239
... balance of terror , " if it is stable , is simply a mas- sive and modern version of an ancient institution : the exchange of hostages . In older times , one committed himself to a promise by delivering his hostages physically into the ...
... balance of terror , " if it is stable , is simply a mas- sive and modern version of an ancient institution : the exchange of hostages . In older times , one committed himself to a promise by delivering his hostages physically into the ...
Page 251
... balance of terror the lack of temptation to de- liberate surprise attack , and the immunity of the situation to false alarm will be greatly affected by the military arrange- ments that we try to work out with the Russians . As nature re ...
... balance of terror the lack of temptation to de- liberate surprise attack , and the immunity of the situation to false alarm will be greatly affected by the military arrange- ments that we try to work out with the Russians . As nature re ...
Contents
The Retarded Science of International Strategy | 3 |
An Essay on Bargaining | 21 |
Bargaining Communication and Limited War | 53 |
Copyright | |
11 other sections not shown
Other editions - View all
Common terms and phrases
action advantage adversary agreement all-out balance of terror bargaining game behavior cell chance Chapter choice choose clue Column commitment communication concert conflict cooperative game coordination coordination game decision depends deterrence enemy enforcement evidence example expected value game theory identify incentive initial interest involved irrational John Harsanyi jointly kind knows likelihood limited limited war Luce and Raiffa mathematical matrix means military minimax missiles mixed strategies move mutual Nash Nash point negotiation no-attack nonzero-sum game nuclear weapons offer one's other's outcome pair participants particular partner party payoff payoff matrix penalty play possible potential preference principle probability problem promise pure Quemoy random rational players recognize retaliation retaliatory forces risk role Row's rules Russians side situation solution strategy strike structure suggestion suppose surprise attack symmetry tacit bargaining tacit game tactic threat threaten tion tive value system yield zero-sum game