The Strategy of ConflictNo background in mathematics needed, but some knowledge of game theory useful. |
From inside the book
Results 1-3 of 70
Page 78
... depends - and the Russians know that it depends on how likely we consider it that such retaliation could itself remain limited . That is , it depends on how likely it is in our judgment that 78 ELEMENTS OF A THEORY OF STRATEGY.
... depends - and the Russians know that it depends on how likely we consider it that such retaliation could itself remain limited . That is , it depends on how likely it is in our judgment that 78 ELEMENTS OF A THEORY OF STRATEGY.
Page 157
... depends on his anticipation of the threatener's final choice . The threatener's first choice- to threaten or not - thus depends on what he expects the threat- Column sees that he needn't reason any further , that Row has a clearly deter ...
... depends on his anticipation of the threatener's final choice . The threatener's first choice- to threaten or not - thus depends on what he expects the threat- Column sees that he needn't reason any further , that Row has a clearly deter ...
Page 285
... depend- ing on intellectual coordination , has a component that is in- herently empirical ; it depends on how people can coordinate their expectations . It depends therefore on skill and on context . The rational player must address ...
... depend- ing on intellectual coordination , has a component that is in- herently empirical ; it depends on how people can coordinate their expectations . It depends therefore on skill and on context . The rational player must address ...
Contents
The Retarded Science of International Strategy | 3 |
An Essay on Bargaining | 21 |
Bargaining Communication and Limited War | 53 |
Copyright | |
11 other sections not shown
Other editions - View all
Common terms and phrases
action advantage adversary agreement all-out balance of terror bargaining game behavior cell chance Chapter choice choose clue Column commitment communication concert conflict cooperative game coordination coordination game decision depends deterrence enemy enforcement evidence example expected value game theory identify incentive initial interest involved irrational John Harsanyi jointly kind knows likelihood limited limited war Luce and Raiffa mathematical matrix means military minimax missiles mixed strategies move mutual Nash Nash point negotiation no-attack nonzero-sum game nuclear weapons offer one's other's outcome pair participants particular partner party payoff payoff matrix penalty play possible potential preference principle probability problem promise pure Quemoy random rational players recognize retaliation retaliatory forces risk role Row's rules Russians side situation solution strategy strike structure suggestion suppose surprise attack symmetry tacit bargaining tacit game tactic threat threaten tion tive value system yield zero-sum game