## The strategy of conflict |

### From inside the book

Results 1-3 of 73

Page 19

Many of these

, rationality, knowledge, control, or freedom of choice. They are all, in principle,

valid in certain circumstances ; but seeing through their strangeness and ...

Many of these

**examples**involve some denial of the value of skill, resourcefulness, rationality, knowledge, control, or freedom of choice. They are all, in principle,

valid in certain circumstances ; but seeing through their strangeness and ...

Page 67

In bargains that involve numerical magnitudes, for

strong magnetism in mathematical simplicity. A trivial illustration is the tendency

for the outcomes to be expressed in "round numbers"; the salesman who works ...

In bargains that involve numerical magnitudes, for

**example**, there seems to be astrong magnetism in mathematical simplicity. A trivial illustration is the tendency

for the outcomes to be expressed in "round numbers"; the salesman who works ...

Page 272

For an

of saying that the players may divide a set of rewards if they can reach agreement

on an exhaustive division, let us say that the players may divide a set of rewards

...

For an

**example**, consider the following variant of the cooperative game. Insteadof saying that the players may divide a set of rewards if they can reach agreement

on an exhaustive division, let us say that the players may divide a set of rewards

...

### What people are saying - Write a review

#### LibraryThing Review

User Review - HadriantheBlind - LibraryThingThis is one of the most important books on Game Theory, and also, thankfully, one of the more accessible (certainly much more so than von Neumann's and Morgenstern's book). His main theses are that ... Read full review

### Contents

The Retarded Science of International Strategy | 3 |

An Essay on Bargaining | 21 |

? Bargaining Communication and Limited War | 53 |

Copyright | |

11 other sections not shown

### Other editions - View all

### Common terms and phrases

action advantage adversary agreement all-out balance of terror bargaining game behavior Bernard Brodie bilateral monopoly chance Chapter choice choose clue Column commitment communication concert conflict cooperative game coordination coordination game decision depends deterrence enemy enforcement evidence example expected value explicit game theory identify incentive initial interest involved John Harsanyi jointly kind knows likelihood limited Luce and Raiffa mathematical matrix means military minimax missiles mixed strategies motive move mutual Nash Nash point negotiation no-attack nonzero-sum game nuclear weapons offer one's other's outcome pair participants particular partner party payoff payoff matrix penalty play possible potential preference principle probability problem promise pure Quemoy random rational players recognize retaliation retaliatory forces risk role Row's rules Russians side situation solution stable strategy strike suggestion suppose surprise attack symmetry tacit bargaining tacit game tactic threat threaten tion tive value system yield zero-sum game