## The strategy of conflict |

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Page 180

If it fails, his expectation is a weighted average of o and - Y, the weights being (i -

jt) and * respectively. The

large enough to be effective at all, is given by (i _ P) + P(o - *Y) = i - P - PtY.

If it fails, his expectation is a weighted average of o and - Y, the weights being (i -

jt) and * respectively. The

**expected value**of the outcome, then, when the threat islarge enough to be effective at all, is given by (i _ P) + P(o - *Y) = i - P - PtY.

Page 185

If Row sets it (the probability of his choosing ii) at just above 1/(i + X) he gets the

largest

the lower left cell differs from zero, say 0.5 or -0.5, the formula for optimum value ...

If Row sets it (the probability of his choosing ii) at just above 1/(i + X) he gets the

largest

**expected value**consistent with Column's choice of I. (If Column's payoff inthe lower left cell differs from zero, say 0.5 or -0.5, the formula for optimum value ...

Page 222

24 Each player's strategy choice concerns the pair of values for B and R that will

minimize his expected losses, that is, ... Letting Vr denote the

the game for R, the warning-system problem for R is to choose the pair of values

...

24 Each player's strategy choice concerns the pair of values for B and R that will

minimize his expected losses, that is, ... Letting Vr denote the

**expected value**ofthe game for R, the warning-system problem for R is to choose the pair of values

...

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#### LibraryThing Review

User Review - HadriantheBlind - LibraryThingThis is one of the most important books on Game Theory, and also, thankfully, one of the more accessible (certainly much more so than von Neumann's and Morgenstern's book). His main theses are that ... Read full review

### Contents

The Retarded Science of International Strategy | 3 |

An Essay on Bargaining | 21 |

? Bargaining Communication and Limited War | 53 |

Copyright | |

11 other sections not shown

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### Common terms and phrases

action advantage adversary agreement all-out balance of terror bargaining game behavior Bernard Brodie bilateral monopoly chance Chapter choice choose clue Column commitment communication concert conflict cooperative game coordination coordination game decision depends deterrence enemy enforcement evidence example expected value explicit game theory identify incentive initial interest involved John Harsanyi jointly kind knows likelihood limited Luce and Raiffa mathematical matrix means military minimax missiles mixed strategies motive move mutual Nash Nash point negotiation no-attack nonzero-sum game nuclear weapons offer one's other's outcome pair participants particular partner party payoff payoff matrix penalty play possible potential preference principle probability problem promise pure Quemoy random rational players recognize retaliation retaliatory forces risk role Row's rules Russians side situation solution stable strategy strike suggestion suppose surprise attack symmetry tacit bargaining tacit game tactic threat threaten tion tive value system yield zero-sum game