## The strategy of conflict |

### From inside the book

Results 1-3 of 61

Page 12

Automobile drivers have an evident common

conflict of

the other through. Collision being about as mutual as anything can be, and ...

Automobile drivers have an evident common

**interest**in avoiding collision and aconflict of

**interest**over who shall go first and who shall slam on his brakes and letthe other through. Collision being about as mutual as anything can be, and ...

Page 15

It is faithful to our definition of "strategy": it takes conflict for granted, but also

assumes common

value-maximizing mode of behavior; and it focuses on the fact that each

participant's ...

It is faithful to our definition of "strategy": it takes conflict for granted, but also

assumes common

**interest**between the adversaries ; it assumes a "rational"value-maximizing mode of behavior; and it focuses on the fact that each

participant's ...

Page 88

All possible outcomes of a pure-conflict game would be represented by some or

all of the points on a negatively inclined line, those of a pure common-

game by some or all of the points on a positively inclined line. In the mixed game,

...

All possible outcomes of a pure-conflict game would be represented by some or

all of the points on a negatively inclined line, those of a pure common-

**interest**game by some or all of the points on a positively inclined line. In the mixed game,

...

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#### LibraryThing Review

User Review - HadriantheBlind - LibraryThingThis is one of the most important books on Game Theory, and also, thankfully, one of the more accessible (certainly much more so than von Neumann's and Morgenstern's book). His main theses are that ... Read full review

### Contents

The Retarded Science of International Strategy | 3 |

An Essay on Bargaining | 21 |

? Bargaining Communication and Limited War | 53 |

Copyright | |

11 other sections not shown

### Other editions - View all

### Common terms and phrases

action advantage adversary agreement all-out balance of terror bargaining game behavior Bernard Brodie bilateral monopoly chance Chapter choice choose clue Column commitment communication concert conflict cooperative game coordination coordination game decision depends deterrence enemy enforcement evidence example expected value explicit game theory identify incentive initial interest involved John Harsanyi jointly kind knows likelihood limited Luce and Raiffa mathematical matrix means military minimax missiles mixed strategies motive move mutual Nash Nash point negotiation no-attack nonzero-sum game nuclear weapons offer one's other's outcome pair participants particular partner party payoff payoff matrix penalty play possible potential preference principle probability problem promise pure Quemoy random rational players recognize retaliation retaliatory forces risk role Row's rules Russians side situation solution stable strategy strike suggestion suppose surprise attack symmetry tacit bargaining tacit game tactic threat threaten tion tive value system yield zero-sum game