The Strategy of ConflictNo background in mathematics needed, but some knowledge of game theory useful. |
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Page 164
... jointly or individually , can actu- ally do better than a purely formal game theory predicts and should consequently ignore the strategic principles produced by such a theory.1 1 1A good laboratory example of the communication ...
... jointly or individually , can actu- ally do better than a purely formal game theory predicts and should consequently ignore the strategic principles produced by such a theory.1 1 1A good laboratory example of the communication ...
Page 260
... jointly less favorable limit or to none at all , and may further weaken the yet unbroken rules by providing evidence ... jointly recognized expectation that they will be used if it is expedient to use them . There is no such tradition ...
... jointly less favorable limit or to none at all , and may further weaken the yet unbroken rules by providing evidence ... jointly recognized expectation that they will be used if it is expedient to use them . There is no such tradition ...
Page 291
... jointly admissible strategy pairs . ( 2 ) All jointly admissible equi- librium pairs are both interchangeable and equivalent . ” 2 1 " Noncooperative " is the traditional name for the game without overt com- munication . Unfortunately ...
... jointly admissible strategy pairs . ( 2 ) All jointly admissible equi- librium pairs are both interchangeable and equivalent . ” 2 1 " Noncooperative " is the traditional name for the game without overt com- munication . Unfortunately ...
Contents
The Retarded Science of International Strategy | 3 |
An Essay on Bargaining | 21 |
Bargaining Communication and Limited War | 53 |
Copyright | |
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action advantage adversary agreement all-out balance of terror bargaining game behavior cell chance Chapter choice choose clue Column commitment communication concert conflict cooperative game coordination coordination game decision depends deterrence enemy enforcement evidence example expected value game theory identify incentive initial interest involved irrational John Harsanyi jointly kind knows likelihood limited limited war Luce and Raiffa mathematical matrix means military minimax missiles mixed strategies move mutual Nash Nash point negotiation no-attack nonzero-sum game nuclear weapons offer one's other's outcome pair participants particular partner party payoff payoff matrix penalty play possible potential preference principle probability problem promise pure Quemoy random rational players recognize retaliation retaliatory forces risk role Row's rules Russians side situation solution strategy strike structure suggestion suppose surprise attack symmetry tacit bargaining tacit game tactic threat threaten tion tive value system yield zero-sum game