The Strategy of ConflictNo background in mathematics needed, but some knowledge of game theory useful. |
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Page 3
... kind of behavior . Crudely ( speaking , the latter treat conflict as a kind of contest , in which the participants are trying to " win . " A study of conscious , intelli- gent , sophisticated conflict behavior of successful behavior- is ...
... kind of behavior . Crudely ( speaking , the latter treat conflict as a kind of contest , in which the participants are trying to " win . " A study of conscious , intelli- gent , sophisticated conflict behavior of successful behavior- is ...
Page 58
... kind of uniqueness ; the man and his wife cannot meet at the " lost and found " if the store has several . The writer's experiments with alternative maps indicated clearly that a map with many houses and a single crossroads sends people ...
... kind of uniqueness ; the man and his wife cannot meet at the " lost and found " if the store has several . The writer's experiments with alternative maps indicated clearly that a map with many houses and a single crossroads sends people ...
Page 84
... kind of behavior is conducive to mutual accommoda- tion , or how mutual dependence can be exploited for unilateral gain . If the zero - sum game is the limiting case of pure conflict , what is the other extreme ? It must be the " pure ...
... kind of behavior is conducive to mutual accommoda- tion , or how mutual dependence can be exploited for unilateral gain . If the zero - sum game is the limiting case of pure conflict , what is the other extreme ? It must be the " pure ...
Contents
The Retarded Science of International Strategy | 3 |
An Essay on Bargaining | 21 |
Bargaining Communication and Limited War | 53 |
Copyright | |
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action advantage adversary agreement all-out balance of terror bargaining game behavior cell chance Chapter choice choose clue Column commitment communication concert conflict cooperative game coordination coordination game decision depends deterrence enemy enforcement evidence example expected value game theory identify incentive initial interest involved irrational John Harsanyi jointly kind knows likelihood limited limited war Luce and Raiffa mathematical matrix means military minimax missiles mixed strategies move mutual Nash Nash point negotiation no-attack nonzero-sum game nuclear weapons offer one's other's outcome pair participants particular partner party payoff payoff matrix penalty play possible potential preference principle probability problem promise pure Quemoy random rational players recognize retaliation retaliatory forces risk role Row's rules Russians side situation solution strategy strike structure suggestion suppose surprise attack symmetry tacit bargaining tacit game tactic threat threaten tion tive value system yield zero-sum game