## The strategy of conflict |

### From inside the book

Results 1-3 of 69

Page 23

Suppose each

pay up to twenty and the seller

Suppose each

**knows**everything about the other, and each**knows**what the other**knows**. What is there to fool about? The buyer may say that, though he'd reallypay up to twenty and the seller

**knows**it, he is firmly resolved as a tactical ...Page 70

In such a situation any potential outcome is one from which at least one of the

parties, and probably both, would have been willing to retreat for the sake of

agreement, and very often the other party

therefore ...

In such a situation any potential outcome is one from which at least one of the

parties, and probably both, would have been willing to retreat for the sake of

agreement, and very often the other party

**knows**it. Any potential outcome istherefore ...

Page 115

To assume that either

an extraordinary assumption about the institutional arrangements of the ... How

can we

To assume that either

**knows**the "true" payoff matrix of the other is often to makean extraordinary assumption about the institutional arrangements of the ... How

can we

**know**how badly the Russians would dislike an all-out war in which both ...### What people are saying - Write a review

#### LibraryThing Review

User Review - HadriantheBlind - LibraryThingThis is one of the most important books on Game Theory, and also, thankfully, one of the more accessible (certainly much more so than von Neumann's and Morgenstern's book). His main theses are that ... Read full review

### Contents

The Retarded Science of International Strategy | 3 |

An Essay on Bargaining | 21 |

? Bargaining Communication and Limited War | 53 |

Copyright | |

11 other sections not shown

### Other editions - View all

### Common terms and phrases

action advantage adversary agreement all-out balance of terror bargaining game behavior Bernard Brodie bilateral monopoly chance Chapter choice choose clue Column commitment communication concert conflict cooperative game coordination coordination game decision depends deterrence enemy enforcement evidence example expected value explicit game theory identify incentive initial interest involved John Harsanyi jointly kind knows likelihood limited Luce and Raiffa mathematical matrix means military minimax missiles mixed strategies motive move mutual Nash Nash point negotiation no-attack nonzero-sum game nuclear weapons offer one's other's outcome pair participants particular partner party payoff payoff matrix penalty play possible potential preference principle probability problem promise pure Quemoy random rational players recognize retaliation retaliatory forces risk role Row's rules Russians side situation solution stable strategy strike suggestion suppose surprise attack symmetry tacit bargaining tacit game tactic threat threaten tion tive value system yield zero-sum game