## The strategy of conflict |

### From inside the book

Results 1-3 of 23

Page 113

They might have it only if the players perceived each other to be

... It is that the

the historical properties, the legal and moral properties, the cultural properties, ...

They might have it only if the players perceived each other to be

**mathematicians**.... It is that the

**mathematical**properties of a game, like the aesthetic properties,the historical properties, the legal and moral properties, the cultural properties, ...

Page 114

(In many cases these

symmetry that would have nonmathematical definitions and nonmathematical

appeal, too, or would happen to coincide with qualitatively distinguishable points

that ...

(In many cases these

**mathematical**properties would be a uniqueness orsymmetry that would have nonmathematical definitions and nonmathematical

appeal, too, or would happen to coincide with qualitatively distinguishable points

that ...

Page 285

metry does provide the focus for coordinated expectations, and demonstrably

possible to set up games in which some other aspect of the game focusses

expectations. (These other aspects are commonly not contained in the

metry does provide the focus for coordinated expectations, and demonstrably

possible to set up games in which some other aspect of the game focusses

expectations. (These other aspects are commonly not contained in the

**mathematical**...### What people are saying - Write a review

#### LibraryThing Review

User Review - HadriantheBlind - LibraryThingThis is one of the most important books on Game Theory, and also, thankfully, one of the more accessible (certainly much more so than von Neumann's and Morgenstern's book). His main theses are that ... Read full review

### Contents

The Retarded Science of International Strategy | 3 |

An Essay on Bargaining | 21 |

? Bargaining Communication and Limited War | 53 |

Copyright | |

11 other sections not shown

### Other editions - View all

### Common terms and phrases

action advantage adversary agreement all-out balance of terror bargaining game behavior Bernard Brodie bilateral monopoly chance Chapter choice choose clue Column commitment communication concert conflict cooperative game coordination coordination game decision depends deterrence enemy enforcement evidence example expected value explicit game theory identify incentive initial interest involved John Harsanyi jointly kind knows likelihood limited Luce and Raiffa mathematical matrix means military minimax missiles mixed strategies motive move mutual Nash Nash point negotiation no-attack nonzero-sum game nuclear weapons offer one's other's outcome pair participants particular partner party payoff payoff matrix penalty play possible potential preference principle probability problem promise pure Quemoy random rational players recognize retaliation retaliatory forces risk role Row's rules Russians side situation solution stable strategy strike suggestion suppose surprise attack symmetry tacit bargaining tacit game tactic threat threaten tion tive value system yield zero-sum game