The Strategy of ConflictNo background in mathematics needed, but some knowledge of game theory useful. |
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Page 113
... Mathematical Foci . We must avoid assuming that everything the analyst can perceive is perceived by the participants in a game , or that whatever exerts power of sug- gestion on the analyst does so on the participant in a game . In ...
... Mathematical Foci . We must avoid assuming that everything the analyst can perceive is perceived by the participants in a game , or that whatever exerts power of sug- gestion on the analyst does so on the participant in a game . In ...
Page 114
... mathematical properties would be a uniqueness or symmetry that would have nonmathematical defini- tions and nonmathematical appeal , too , or would happen to coin- cide with qualitatively distinguishable points that could be ration ...
... mathematical properties would be a uniqueness or symmetry that would have nonmathematical defini- tions and nonmathematical appeal , too , or would happen to coin- cide with qualitatively distinguishable points that could be ration ...
Page 285
... mathematical structure of the game but are part of the " topical content " ; that is , they usually depend on the " labeling " of players and strategies , to use the term of Luce and Raiffa mentioned in Chapter 4. ) I have no basis for ...
... mathematical structure of the game but are part of the " topical content " ; that is , they usually depend on the " labeling " of players and strategies , to use the term of Luce and Raiffa mentioned in Chapter 4. ) I have no basis for ...
Contents
The Retarded Science of International Strategy | 3 |
An Essay on Bargaining | 21 |
Bargaining Communication and Limited War | 53 |
Copyright | |
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Common terms and phrases
action advantage adversary agreement all-out balance of terror bargaining game behavior cell chance Chapter choice choose clue Column commitment communication concert conflict cooperative game coordination coordination game decision depends deterrence enemy enforcement evidence example expected value game theory identify incentive initial interest involved irrational John Harsanyi jointly kind knows likelihood limited limited war Luce and Raiffa mathematical matrix means military minimax missiles mixed strategies move mutual Nash Nash point negotiation no-attack nonzero-sum game nuclear weapons offer one's other's outcome pair participants particular partner party payoff payoff matrix penalty play possible potential preference principle probability problem promise pure Quemoy random rational players recognize retaliation retaliatory forces risk role Row's rules Russians side situation solution strategy strike structure suggestion suppose surprise attack symmetry tacit bargaining tacit game tactic threat threaten tion tive value system yield zero-sum game