## The strategy of conflict |

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Page 150

INCORPORATION OF MOVES IN A GAME

a game has potential moves like threats, commitments, and promises that are

susceptible of formal analysis, it must be possible to represent such moves in the

...

INCORPORATION OF MOVES IN A GAME

**MATRIX**One is led to suppose that, ifa game has potential moves like threats, commitments, and promises that are

susceptible of formal analysis, it must be possible to represent such moves in the

...

Page 152

with penalty of 5 would yield the

larger

the original game, such as those in Fig. 15 A, but also the strategies of commit, ...

with penalty of 5 would yield the

**matrix**in Fig. 15 C.) Can we now build up alarger

**matrix**that represents not only the actual choices of rows and columns inthe original game, such as those in Fig. 15 A, but also the strategies of commit, ...

Page 212

We work this problem by recomputing the pay-offs in the original

two parameters representing the probability of "irrational" attack. The upper left

cell in the

...

We work this problem by recomputing the pay-offs in the original

**matrix**, using thetwo parameters representing the probability of "irrational" attack. The upper left

cell in the

**matrix**stays as it was. The lower right cell has its pay-offs recomputed,...

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#### LibraryThing Review

User Review - HadriantheBlind - LibraryThingThis is one of the most important books on Game Theory, and also, thankfully, one of the more accessible (certainly much more so than von Neumann's and Morgenstern's book). His main theses are that ... Read full review

### Contents

The Retarded Science of International Strategy | 3 |

An Essay on Bargaining | 21 |

? Bargaining Communication and Limited War | 53 |

Copyright | |

11 other sections not shown

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### Common terms and phrases

action advantage adversary agreement all-out balance of terror bargaining game behavior Bernard Brodie bilateral monopoly chance Chapter choice choose clue Column commitment communication concert conflict cooperative game coordination coordination game decision depends deterrence enemy enforcement evidence example expected value explicit game theory identify incentive initial interest involved John Harsanyi jointly kind knows likelihood limited Luce and Raiffa mathematical matrix means military minimax missiles mixed strategies motive move mutual Nash Nash point negotiation no-attack nonzero-sum game nuclear weapons offer one's other's outcome pair participants particular partner party payoff payoff matrix penalty play possible potential preference principle probability problem promise pure Quemoy random rational players recognize retaliation retaliatory forces risk role Row's rules Russians side situation solution stable strategy strike suggestion suppose surprise attack symmetry tacit bargaining tacit game tactic threat threaten tion tive value system yield zero-sum game