The Strategy of ConflictNo background in mathematics needed, but some knowledge of game theory useful. |
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Page 150
... MATRIX One is led to suppose that , if a game has potential moves like threats , commitments , and promises that are susceptible of formal analysis , it must be possible to represent such moves in the traditional form of strategy ...
... MATRIX One is led to suppose that , if a game has potential moves like threats , commitments , and promises that are susceptible of formal analysis , it must be possible to represent such moves in the traditional form of strategy ...
Page 152
... matrix form , we get Fig . 16. The 12 X 8 matrix of Fig . 16 represents the tacit ( " noncooperative " ) game that corresponds to the players ' private decisions on how to play the original game . The eight possible strategies available ...
... matrix form , we get Fig . 16. The 12 X 8 matrix of Fig . 16 represents the tacit ( " noncooperative " ) game that corresponds to the players ' private decisions on how to play the original game . The eight possible strategies available ...
Page 212
... matrix would yield a modified matrix like the one in Fig . 20.3 With proba- I II 0 -.4 i O .4 .4 .64 ii .4 .64 FIG . 20 8 In effect we view the players as choosing — in the language of game theory - between one " pure " strategy and one ...
... matrix would yield a modified matrix like the one in Fig . 20.3 With proba- I II 0 -.4 i O .4 .4 .64 ii .4 .64 FIG . 20 8 In effect we view the players as choosing — in the language of game theory - between one " pure " strategy and one ...
Contents
The Retarded Science of International Strategy | 3 |
An Essay on Bargaining | 21 |
Bargaining Communication and Limited War | 53 |
Copyright | |
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action advantage adversary agreement all-out balance of terror bargaining game behavior cell chance Chapter choice choose clue Column commitment communication concert conflict cooperative game coordination coordination game decision depends deterrence enemy enforcement evidence example expected value game theory identify incentive initial interest involved irrational John Harsanyi jointly kind knows likelihood limited limited war Luce and Raiffa mathematical matrix means military minimax missiles mixed strategies move mutual Nash Nash point negotiation no-attack nonzero-sum game nuclear weapons offer one's other's outcome pair participants particular partner party payoff payoff matrix penalty play possible potential preference principle probability problem promise pure Quemoy random rational players recognize retaliation retaliatory forces risk role Row's rules Russians side situation solution strategy strike structure suggestion suppose surprise attack symmetry tacit bargaining tacit game tactic threat threaten tion tive value system yield zero-sum game