The Strategy of ConflictNo background in mathematics needed, but some knowledge of game theory useful. |
From inside the book
Results 1-3 of 8
Page 233
... missiles and bombers that can exploit the advantage of striking first and consequently provide a temptation to do so . - - In identifying the surprise - attack problem as the possible vul- nerability of each side's retaliatory forces to ...
... missiles and bombers that can exploit the advantage of striking first and consequently provide a temptation to do so . - - In identifying the surprise - attack problem as the possible vul- nerability of each side's retaliatory forces to ...
Page 234
... missiles , sub- marines , and aircraft carriers on both sides , as though we wanted to see who could put on the most impressive peace - time parade . " Who is ahead " in the arms race will usually be : whoever strikes first . And if we ...
... missiles , sub- marines , and aircraft carriers on both sides , as though we wanted to see who could put on the most impressive peace - time parade . " Who is ahead " in the arms race will usually be : whoever strikes first . And if we ...
Page 243
... missiles , and submarines wherever they go , one can still consider calling the aircraft , missiles , and submarines to assemble where they are more easily watched . If restrictions on the deployment of forces are used to make the task ...
... missiles , and submarines wherever they go , one can still consider calling the aircraft , missiles , and submarines to assemble where they are more easily watched . If restrictions on the deployment of forces are used to make the task ...
Contents
The Retarded Science of International Strategy | 3 |
An Essay on Bargaining | 21 |
Bargaining Communication and Limited War | 53 |
Copyright | |
11 other sections not shown
Other editions - View all
Common terms and phrases
action advantage adversary agreement all-out balance of terror bargaining game behavior cell chance Chapter choice choose clue Column commitment communication concert conflict cooperative game coordination coordination game decision depends deterrence enemy enforcement evidence example expected value game theory identify incentive initial interest involved irrational John Harsanyi jointly kind knows likelihood limited limited war Luce and Raiffa mathematical matrix means military minimax missiles mixed strategies move mutual Nash Nash point negotiation no-attack nonzero-sum game nuclear weapons offer one's other's outcome pair participants particular partner party payoff payoff matrix penalty play possible potential preference principle probability problem promise pure Quemoy random rational players recognize retaliation retaliatory forces risk role Row's rules Russians side situation solution strategy strike structure suggestion suppose surprise attack symmetry tacit bargaining tacit game tactic threat threaten tion tive value system yield zero-sum game